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GRAPPLING WITH GENDER EQUITY
Jerry R. Parkinson*
In this twenty-fifth anniversary year of the enactment of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, the issue of gender equity in athletics is as
divisive as ever. Lawsuits by female athletes and the demise of many men's
teams have changed perceptions of Title IX in the 1990s and have provided
an impetus for a thorough reexamination of the gender equity issue.
In this Article, Professor Parkinson begins with a brief overview of the
regulatory framework governing Title IX's application to athletics. He then
examines the legal standards by which the Department of Education's Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) and the courts review athletics programs for Title IX
compliance. In examining these standards, Parkinson emphasizes OCR's
three-part standard by considering it in light of OCR's recent Clarification
and the most recent case law. This Article also probes what may be the
most divisive gender equity issue in recent years--the elimination of men's
sports as a means of narrowing the opportunity gap between men and wom-
en.
These whinings [of men's team coaches] . . . make them
look shallow and-above all else-guilty....
But those who have supported women's issues, for the
most part, haven't helped matters. They've taken the law and
shaken it in the faces of their male peers like a Bible before
a sinner ....'
INTRODUCTION
In this twenty-fifth anniversary year of the enactment of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,2 the issue of gender equity in athletics is
as divisive as ever. Many defenders of the status quo view Title IX simply
as the latest pet cause of "militant" feminists3 and "gender quota extrem-
" Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author acknowl-
edges the longstanding support of an extraordinarily generous colleague, Mark R.
Gillett.
' Bill Campbell, Judge Must Dismiss Drivel, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct.
28, 1995, at D2, quoted in NCAA NEWS, Nov. 13, 1995, at 4.
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (Supp. 111972 & 1988).
3 See, e.g., Dale Anderson, Letter to the Editor, NCAA NEWS, May 24, 1995, at 4
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ists."4 Conversely, Title IX proponents often view concerns about reduction
or elimination of men's sports as "men's whining about the fact that the
playing field is finally being leveled."5
Perhaps this polarization is to be expected. After all, female athletes
have been waiting twenty-five years for school administrators to comply
with the law, 6 and twenty-five years is a long time to keep one's patience.
It was inevitable that female athletes eventually would turn to litigation, the
ultimate polarizer, in their efforts to secure equitable treatment. Women's
gains over the last several years, however, often have come at the expense
of men's teams.' Although women's sports advocates may have difficulty
empathizing with male athletes and coaches who lose athletic opportuni-
ties, 8 they must remember that the athletic benefits they herald for women
are equally important to men. Men who lose athletic opportunities should
(referring to "militant women's groups" engaged in a "misinformation" campaign) (An-
derson is a former NCAA wrestling champion who serves as Title IX project attorney
for the National Wrestling Coaches Association); Debra E. Blum, Officials of Big-Time
College Football See Threat in Moves to Cut Costs and Provide Equity for Women,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 16, 1993, at A35 (quoting Edmund P. Joyce, former Uni-
versity of Notre Dame executive vice-president, at the 17th annual convention of the
College Football Association: "Frankly, I have been dismayed at the publicity and ap-
parent support the militant women have received on their irrational attack of football as
their bugaboo.").
" Leo Kocher, A Fair Hearing to Review Title IX, NCAA NEWS, Apr. 19, 1995, at
4. Kocher is the University of Chicago's head wrestling coach. See also Robert C.
Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 Hous. L. REV. 993, 996 (1995) ("In the lock-
er room, the football stadium, and in the athletic director's office, Title IX is viewed as
an annoying and extremist intrusion, driven by militant women.").
' Debra E. Blum, Men Turn to Federal Anti-Bias Laws to Protect Teams from
Chopping Block, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 11, 1993, at A33 (quoting Diane M.
Henson, plaintiffs' attorney in University of Texas gender-equity litigation).
6 One commentator has suggested that it is "somewhat misleading" to accuse school
administrators of recalcitrance for that period due to uncertainty in the 1970s and 1980s
about whether Title IX applied to athletics programs. B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and
Promises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 558 (1993). For
a brief discussion of that issue,'see infra note 350.
' See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
8 Professor Stephen F. Ross served as a member of the Athletic Board of the Uni-
versity of Illinois, where the men's swimming team was eliminated in 1993 in an effort
to cut athletics programs costs. The university retained the women's swimming team
due to Title IX concerns. Id. Professor Ross expressed dismay at "the genuine pain a
number of people ... experienced in making these program cuts." Stephen F. Ross, et
al., Rededication Panel Discussion on Gender Equity and Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995
U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 141. To Professor Ross, "the decision on the men's swimming
team was not that difficult ... [because] the swimmers had been getting an extremely
fortuitous benefit for twenty years, by receiving scholarships at all." Id.
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not be expected to go down without a fight.
Lawsuits by female athletes and the demise of many men's teams have
changed perceptions of Title IX in the 1990s and have provided an impetus
for a thorough reexamination of the gender equity issue. In late 1994, repre-
sentatives of several men's coaching organizations began a concerted effort
to convince Congress to hold hearings on Title IX and its impact on men's
sports.9 Much of their concern resulted from three 1993 federal appellate
court decisions that held in favor of female athletes who had sued their
universities under Title IX.10 The coaches' lobbying bore fruit in May 1995
when the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education, Training, and
Lifelong Learning heard three hours of testimony on Title IX and its en-
forcement by the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights
(OCR)." Despite several witnesses' pleas for Congress to "take back con-
trol" of the Title IX enforcement process, 2 the House panel expressed no
interest in amending Title IX or its regulations. 3 Thus, for the foreseeable
future, the enforcement of Title IX will remain in the hands of OCR and the
courts.
To date, the courts generally have deferred to OCR and its three-part
Policy Interpretation that explains how schools can comply with Title IX
mandates. 4 One important development, however, is a January 1996 feder-
al district court decision, Pederson v. Louisiana State University.5 In
Pederson, the court questioned both OCR's Policy Interpretation and federal
9 Mike Zapler, Protecting Men's Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 6, 1995, at
A43. The coaches contended that Title IX played a major role in many-schools' elimi-
nation of men's sports programs, to the extent that some sports, such as gymnastics,
swimming, and wrestling, faced extinction. Id. The shrinkage of some sports is very
real. In academic year 1974-1975, 401 of the 704 NCAA schools sponsored wrestling
programs, but in 1994-1995, despite an increase to 909 NCAA member schools, only
261 wrestling programs remained. Id. at A44. Gymnastics programs dwindled from 133
to 32 during the same time period. Id.
" Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (reinstating women's
field hockey and gymnastics programs); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir.) (reinstating women's softball program), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1004 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (reinstating women's
gymnastics and volleyball programs).
" Debra E. Blum, House Panel Hears Title IX Debate but Schedules No Further
Action, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 19, 1995, at A41.
12 Id. (quoting Rep. J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., the lobbyists' principal supporter in
Congress and a former college wrestler and high school wrestling coach).
" Id. Representative Pat Williams, D-Mont., a subcommittee member, declared that
Title IX compliance should be a matter for schools to resolve, without the intervention
of Congress or the courts. Id.
14 See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896-97. For the text of
OCR's three-part test, see infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
"S 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
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courts' previous applications of that standard.
The May 1995 congressional hearing led to another significant develop-
ment. In June 1995, OCR committed to clarifying its enforcement standards
to give schools more concrete guidance in their efforts to comply with Title
IX. 6 OCR released an initial draft of its Clarification in September 1995,
and, following a comment and review period, issued its final Clarification
on January 16, 1996.'
This Article begins with a brief overview of the. regulatory framework
governing Title IX's application to athletics.' It then examines the legal
standards by which OCR and the courts review athletics programs for Title
IX compliance. In examining these standards, this Article particularly em-
phasizes OCR's three-part standard 9 by considering it in light of OCR's
recent Clarification and the most recent case law, including Pederson.2'
This Article also probes what may be the most divisive gender equity issue
in recent years-the elimination of men's sports as a means of narrowing
the opportunity gap between men and women.2
I. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Title IX
In 1972, Congress enacted Title. IX to prohibit sex discrimination in
schools receiving federal funds.22 Title IX mandates that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
16 In July 1995, the House Appropriations Committee approved legislation that
would have withheld appropriations for OCR compliance investigations if OCR had not
issued new "objective criteria" for determining compliance with Title IX by the end of
the year. Douglas Lederman, House Bill Targets Enforcement of Federal Sex-Bias Law
in College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 4, 1995, at A26. In June, however,
Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary of Education and the head of OCR, had promised
to clarify the policy. Id. Shortly thereafter, members of Congress weighed in on the
matter: 96 House members sent a letter to Cantu urging that OCR's current interpreta-
tion of Title IX be upheld, and 134 House members submitted their own letter criticiz-
ing the OCR stance and recommending changes. Id.
17 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLE-
GIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (1996) [hereinafter OCR
CLARIFICATION].
18 See infra Part I.
19 See infra Part II. Case law and OCR's three-part test focus on men's and
women's equal opportunity to participate, rather than on the equal treatment of existing
men's and women's teams. See infra text accompanying notes 45-50. This Article's
scope is limited to the question of equal opportunity to participate.
912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
21 See infra Part III.
2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (Supp. 11 1972 & 1988).
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in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any edu-
cation program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'23 To en-
force that broad mandate, Congress directed the Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to prepare regulations to imple-
ment Title IX.'
B. The Regulations
Although a dearth of legislative history left in doubt Title IX's applica-
tion to athletics,' in June 1974, HEW issued proposed regulations that in-
cluded specific provisions governing intercollegiate athletics programs. 2 In
response to the proposed regulations, HEW received nearly 10,000 com-
ments, with the athletic provisions generating the most controversy. The
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was one of the re-
spondents that challenged Title IX's applicability to intercollegiate athletics.
The NCAA proposed, at a minimum, an exemption for revenue-producing
sports.' The United States Senate passed such an exemption in the "Tower
Amendment" to the Education Amendments of 1974.29 Congress, however,
ultimately rejected the exemption and replaced the Tower Amendment with
the "Javits Amendment," which simply instructed HEW to consider "the
nature of particular sports" when drafting its final regulations.'
In June 1975, following substantial redrafting and presidential approval,
HEW submitted the final regulations to Congress. for review.3' Congress
Id. § 1681(a).
u Id. § 1682.
See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title
IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTs L. REV. 1, 9 & n.30 (1992). Congress included no
committee report with the final bill, and the congressional debate only briefly men-
tioned athletics. See 118 CONG. REC. 5,807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh's statement regarding
football teams' and locker rooms' continued segregation); 117 CONG. REC. 30,407
(1971) (Sen. Bayh's statement regarding privacy in "sports facilities").
26 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974).
27 Mark H. Rettig, Note, Sex Discrimination and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IOWA
L. REV. 420, 471-74 (1975).
2I Id. at 473.
29 Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (93 Stat.) 4093,
4271.
30 "The Secretary shall prepare and publish ... proposed regulations implementing
the provisions of title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 relating to the prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination in federally assisted education programs which shall include
with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the
nature of particular sports." Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974). The pas-
sage of the Javits Amendment suggests a congressional intent to include intercollegiate
athletics programs within the scope of Title IX.
" On June 4, 1975, the final regulations were published in the Federal Register,
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held several hearings and debates during June and July but took no action to
reject the regulations, which became effective on July 21, 1975.32
The Title IX athletics regulations are broad. The regulations govern both
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics, as well as intramural and club
sports.33 The regulations require an institution sponsoring any of these
types of athletics programs to provide "equal athletic opportunity for mem-
bers of both sexes."34 The regulations set forth a nonexclusive list of ten
factors that OCR will consider in determining whether a school has met the
equal opportunity mandate:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of compe-
tition effectively accommodate the interests and abili-
ties of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutor-
ing;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and ser-
vices;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and servic-
with a supporting memorandum from HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger to President
Ford. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128-45 (1975).
32 Rettig, supra note 27, at 470-71; see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 531-32 (1982) (describing in detail the promulgation of the regulations).
33
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be dis-
criminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athlet-
ics offered by a recipient [of federal funds], and no recipient shall provide any
such athletics separately on such basis.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1996).
Note that the citation is to Department of Education regulations. In 1979 Congress
split HEW into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human
Services. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (Supp. III 1979). Congress transferred all education
functions, including education-related OCR functions, to the Department of Education.
Id. § 3441(a). At the time of the split, the existing Title IX regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 86,
were left with the Department of Health and Human Services. The Department of Edu-
cation, however, promulgated its own, identical set of regulations. The Department of
Education's regulations are cited in this Article because OCR, the agency charged with
enforcing Title IX, is part of the Department of Education.
34 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1996).
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es;
(10) Publicity.35
The regulations also address the equitable treatment of the sexes in awarding
athletic scholarships?6
OCR has categorized these ten factors and two factors not specifically
mentioned in the regulations-recruitment and support services-into three
distinct areas of Title IX compliance: (1) "Athletic Financial Assistance
(Scholarships)"; (2) "Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportuni-
ties" (factors 2 through 10 above, plus recruitment and support services);
and (3) "Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities" (factor
1 above).37 OCR set forth these categories in a formal "Policy Interpreta-
tion," which it published in 1979.31
C. The Policy Interpretation
The final Title IX regulations allotted three years to secondary and post-
secondary schools to meet Title IX compliance standards.39 During that
transition period, OCR received more than one hundred formal complaints
alleging sex discrimination in intercollegiate athletics.' From schools, it
also received countless pleas for clarification of the regulations.4 ' In 1978,
in an effort to provide guidance to schools in their compliance efforts and to
reduce the number of complaints filed, OCR proposed a "Policy Interpreta-
tion."' 2 Following an extensive comment and review period, 3 on Decem-
ber 11, 1979, OCR issued a final version of the Policy Interpretation." Be-
35 Id.
3' Id. § 106.37(c). ("To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or
grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of
each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in interscho-
lastic or intercollegiate athletics.").
17 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415-17 (1979).
3' Id. at 71,413.
39 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1996). Elementary schools were required to comply within
one year, by July 21, 1976. Id. To those who objected to the three-year "grace period,"
OCR responded that schools would be required to comply "before the end of the adjust-
ment period wherever possible." 40 Fed. Reg. 24,135 (1975).
' Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (Ist Cir. 1993).
41 See James P. Martin, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Scoring Points for
Women, 8 Oiuo N.L. REV. 481, 492 n.92 (1981) (noting the widespread "confusion
among the university community as to what constituted compliance").
42 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070 (1978).
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cause the Policy Interpretation provides the most specific guidance regarding
OCR's view of what Title IX and its regulations require, the Policy Inter-
pretation has become the principal focus in Title IX compliance cases.
As noted above, the Policy Interpretation divides compliance issues into
three distinct categories and addresses each category separately. The first
two categories are scholarships and "other benefits and opportunities." These
generally are characterized as dealing with "treatment" issues,45 which ad-
dress the manner in which existing women's teams are treated relative to
men's teams in areas such as coaching, facilities, and scheduling. The third
category is accommodation of student interests and abilities, which address-
es participation opportunities.
Treatment issues are critical in an assessment of an institution's compli-
ance with Title IX. Treatment inequities take many familiar forms: schools
provide women second-rate facilities relative to those of men; they make
female athletes ride old buses to away games, while men fly; they schedule
women's games "prior to men's contests as if they are some type of
'warmup"'; 46 they allot women's teams the worst practice times; and they
provide substantially more publicity for men's sporting events than they do
for women's events. All such disparities send a message about women's
second-rate "place" in the athletic cosmos.47
As important as treatment issues are, however, they mean very little
unless women have an opportunity to participate.48 That opportunity "lies
at the core of Title IX's purpose."49 Consequently, the Policy Interpreta-
tion, most of the recent developments in Title IX law, and thus this Article,
focus on OCR's third category, which is effective accommodation of student
interests and abilities."0
" See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ,, 912 F. Supp. 892, 909 (M.D. La.
1996); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 195 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S.
Apr. 21, 1997).
46 Julie Dunn Crawford & John L. Strope, Gender Equity in College Athletics: How
Far Have We Really Come in Twenty Years?, 104 EDuc. L. REP. 553, 554 (1995).
41 See George, supra note 6, at 570.
41 See Melody Harris, Hitting 'Em Where It Hurts: Using Title IX Litigation to
Bring Gender Equity to Athletics, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 57, 81 (1994).
41 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993).
"0 Another reason for this focus is that treatment issues are considerably easier to
evaluate; generally it is not that difficult to compare men's and women's scholarships,
facilities, travel allowances, and recruiting budgets and to make a judgment as to wheth-
er a school is treating the sexes equally. The "effective accommodation of interests and
abilities," on the other hand, is laden with ambiguity.
Other commentators have directed their attention to treatment issues. See, e.g.,
Anne Bloom, Financial Disparity as Evidence of Discrimination Under Title IX, 2
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 5 (1995); George, supra note 6 (case study examining dif-
ferential treatment of the University of Colorado's men's and women's basketball pro-
[Vol. 5:1
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Prior to an analysis of OCR's effective accommodation standard, a
threshold question merits discussion: In light of OCR's separate compliance
categories, is noncompliance in only one category sufficient to violate Title
IX? Alternatively, may a school balance its strengths in one compliance area
against weaknesses in another to achieve overall Title IX compliance?
The leading gender equity case, Cohen v. Brown University,51 consid-
ered this issue. In Cohen, the defendants argued for a program-wide evalua-
tion of their compliance efforts. The district court, however, concluded that
deficiencies in the accommodations area alone could result in a Title IX
violation.52 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed:
Equal opportunity to participate lies at the core of Title
IX's purpose. Because the third compliance area delineates
this heartland, we agree with the district courts that have so
ruled and hold that, with regard to the effective accommoda-
tion of students' interests and abilities, an institution can
violate Title IX even if it meets the ["treatment"] stan-
dards.53
Other courts that have addressed this issue are in accord with Cohen.54
grams). One particularly valuable resource is Valerie M. Bonnette, Title IX Basics, in
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY: A BASIC GUIDE
TO TITLE IX FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 5, 11-26 (1994) [hereinafter NCAA
GENDER EQUITY GUIDE]. Bonnette, a former OCR senior program analyst and co-author
of OCR's 1990 Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual, see infra note 55, addresses
each of the twelve treatment issues from an OCR compliance investigator's perspective.
" 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (preliminary injunction), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993), on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), affid in part, rev'd in part, 101
F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996). This Article focuses on the First Circuit's 1993 opinion. In
1996, that court concluded that its earlier opinion provided "the law of the case." 101
F.3d at 162, 167-69. Thus, the 1993 opinion, which sets forth'the court's most complete
legal analysis, is the "controlling authority." Id. at 162.
52 Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 988-89.
51 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897.
51 See Horner v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 273 (6th Cir.
1994); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 742-43
(N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); accord Favia
v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584-85 (W.D. Pa.) (not addressing the issue
directly, but basing its finding of noncompliance solely on accommodations), afj'd, 7
F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993). Even Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892
(M.D. La. 1996), which strays from the judicial party line in other respects, see infra
text accompanying notes 189-217, appears to agree with this proposition. In Pederson,
the court held that Louisiana State University violated Title IX based solely on an ac-
commodations analysis. Id. at 917.
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Thus, the judiciary has determined that a school that fails to provide suffi-
cient participation opportunities to its female students cannot avoid liability
simply because it treats its female and male athletes equally.
Interestingly, OCR has not taken quite as firm a stance. Indeed, in Co-
hen, the defendants based their argument for a program-wide review largely
on OCR's Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual,55 which states that a
compliance determination generally is made by "reviewing the program as a
whole."56 The Investigator's Manual, however, also indicates that an OCR
investigation "may be limited to ... one or two" of the three major com-
pliance areas57 that the courts have found persuasive. 8 Although OCR ad-
dressed the matter in its January 1996 Clarification,9 that Clarification
provides no clear answer:
It is important to note that under the Policy Interpretation
the requirement to provide nondiscriminatory participation
opportunities is only one of many factors that OCR examines
to determine if an institution is in compliance with the athlet-
ics provision of Title IX. OCR also considers the quality of
competition offered to members of both sexes in order to
determine whether an institution effectively accommodates
the interests and abilities of its students.
S See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 988-89. In 1990, OCR issued the Investigator's Man-
ual to provide guidance to agency personnel in their investigations of intercollegiate and
interscholastic athletics programs. Valerie M. Bonnette & Lamar Daniel, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL [i] (1990) [hereinafter OCR
INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL]. For a discussion of the manual's adoption and women's
groups' early criticism of some of its provisions, see Heckman, supra note 25, at 16
n.64.
OCR first published an Interim Manual in 1980, shortly after it published its Policy
Interpretation. According to Lamar Daniel, co-author of the 1990 Manual, the 1980
draft recognized the accommodations provision as simply one of many factors with "no
added status." Discussions of Title IX and Restructuring Captivate CFA Audience, SIDE-
LINES, July/Aug. 1995, at 4 (reporting Daniel's remarks at the 19th annual convention
of the College Football Association).
56 OCR INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 55, at 10; see Harris, supra note 48,
at 71 ("[T]he Investigator's Manual calls for a balancing of all compliance areas against
each other to determine if there is overall compliance with Title IX."); William E. Thro
& Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown University and the Future of Intercollegiate and
Interscholastic Athletics, 84 EDUc. L. REP. 611, 622 (1993) (asserting that the Cohen
holding is "directly contradictory to OCR's approach of examining all aspects of the
athletic program and allowing the strengths in one area to cancel out a weakness in one
area").
17 OCR INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 55, at 7.
5' See, e.g., Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 989.
9 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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In addition, when an "overall determination of compli-
ance" is made by OCR, .. . OCR examines the institution's
program as a whole. Thus, OCR considers the effective
accommodation of interests and abilities in conjunction with
equivalence in the availability, quality and kinds of other
athletic benefits and opportunities provided male and female
athletes to determine whether an institution provides equal
athletic opportunity as required by Title IX. These other
benefits include coaching, equipment, practice and competi-
tive facilities, recruitment, scheduling of games, and publici-
ty, among others. An institution's failure to provide nondis-
criminatory participation opportunities usually amounts to a
denial of equal athletic opportunity because these opportuni-
ties provide access to all other athletic benefits, treatment,
and services.'
This language indicates that a program-wide evaluation is essential for
an "overall determination of compliance." The critical issue that remains,
however, is whether a finding of noncompliance can be based on only one
of the "many factors" in the Title IX analysis. OCR seems to have avoided
that question. Stating that accommodation deficiencies "usually" will amount
to a Title IX violation will not stop university defendants from pleading for
program-wide reviews.6
Regardless of OCR's position on the matter, the courts seem to be firm
in their conviction that effective accommodation of student interests and
abilities lies at the heart of Title IX. The courts also agree that failure to
meet this standard constitutes a Title IX violation.62 Therefore, it is likely
that the primary gender equity battles will continue to be fought over the
accommodations issue. Furthermore, although private enforcement of Title
IX through litigation has begun to overshadow OCR's governmental en-
forcement,63 in making their judgments, courts have deferred to OCR's Pol-
60 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis added).
61 See, e.g., Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense
to a Title IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender
Equity Based on Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 845, 864, 875, 879-
80 (1994) (arguing for a balancing of all factors). Connolly served as co-counsel for
Brown University in the Cohen litigation. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 187, 188 n.3.
62 See, e.g., Horner v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 273 (6th
Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir.
1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F.Supp. 737, 742-43 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated on
other grounds, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
' Considerable evidence suggests that the spate of Title IX litigation in the 1990s is
a direct result of female athletes' frustration with OCR's lack of meaningful Title IX
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icy Interpretation.' Such judicial deference has reaffirmed the prominence
of OCR's three-part test.
II. THE THREE-PART TEST
To determine whether a school has "effectively accommodate[d] the
interests and abilities"65 of its students, OCR set out in its Policy Interpre-
tation the following three standards:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level66 participation opportu-
nities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respec-
tive enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes,
whether the institution can show a history and con-
tinuing practice of program expansion which is de-
monstrably responsive to the developing interests and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution
cannot show a continuing practice of program expan-
sion such as that cited above, whether it can be dem-
onstrated that the interests and abilities of the mem-
bers of that sex have been fully and effectively ac-
commodated by the present program.67
The use of the disjunctive "or" in the three-part test clearly indicates that
enforcement during the 1980s. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 48, at 58-59; Debra E.
Blum, New Head of Civil-Rights Office Vows to Get Tough on College Sports, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 15, 1993, at A39.
See, e.g., Homer, 43 F.3d at 273 (noting that the Policy Interpretation is "entitled
to substantial deference by the courts"); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828; Cohen, 991 F.2d at
896-97. But cf Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La.
1996) (acknowledging the necessity of granting "great deference" to OCR but suggest-
ing that the Policy Interpretation may be contrary to statutory language and thus need
not be followed).
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1996).
66 Although the Policy Interpretation specifically addresses intercollegiate athletics, it
notes that its "general principles" apply equally to interscholastic, club, and intramural
athletics programs. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The leading decision on Title IX's
application to interscholastic athletics explicitly adopts the Policy Interpretation's three-
part test as the governing standard. Horner, 43 F.3d at 273-74.
67 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979) (footnote added).
[Vol. 5:1
GRAPPLING WITH GENDER EQUITY
compliance with any one of the three parts is sufficient to meet the effective
accommodation requirement. OCR unequivocally reiterated that proposition
in its recent Clarification:
[T]he three-part test furnishes an institution with three
individual avenues to choose from when determining how it
will provide individuals of each sex with nondiscriminatory
opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics. If an
institution has met any part of the three-part test, OCR will
determine that the institution is meeting this requirement."
Even with these three separate avenues to compliance, currently the odds
are against institutions in Title IX actions. The first prong, the "proportion-
ality" test, is particularly difficult to meet.69 Although neither OCR nor the
courts provide clear guidance on what constitutes "substantial" proportionali-
ty, few schools could meet any reasonable definition of the standard. The
NCAA conducted a 1992 gender equity study that indicated that men made
up nearly seventy percent of varsity college athletes although they com-
prised only about fifty percent of the student population.7" A school also
would have difficulty showing a "continuing practice" of expanding
women's athletic opportunities for the simple reason that most schools have
not significantly expanded their athletics programs in recent years; budget
shortfalls often have meant just the opposite.71 Finally, student "interest" in
athletics is extremely difficult to measure.72 To date, courts have shown
little enthusiasm for a careful analysis of the third prong of the test.
68 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 2.
619 See, e.g., Roberts, 814 F.Supp. at 1513 (7.5% differential between female enroll-
ment and athletic participation not substantially proportionate); see also Connolly &
Adelman, supra note 61, at 862-63, 906-07 (noting that OCR provides no statistical test
and suggesting the use of the binomial test established in civil rights cases).
70 NCAA GENDER EQUITY GUIDE, supra note 50, at 1. Apparently these statistics
have improved somewhat, to about 37% female participation in academic year 1994-
1995. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 1, 1996, at A39. In academic year 1994-
1995, the statistics for high school athletes were only slightly more promising: males
comprised 61.2% of interscholastic athletes compared with 38.8% female. More Stu-
dents Taking Part in High-School Athletics, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 25, 1995, at 5.
"' See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[lI]n an era of
fiscal austerity, few universities are prone to expand athletic opportunities.").
2 One current debate centers on whether surveys of students are useful tools for
measuring interest in athletic participation. The NCAA Research Committee has devel-
oped a survey instrument that has been tested at a few schools. Some women's sports
advocates, however, maintain that such instruments are inherently flawed and that a pur-
ported lack of interest should not be used to deny opportunities to women. Ronald D.
Mott, Proportionality Meets Interest, NCAA NEWS, Feb. 15, 1995, at 1.
"' See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900 (noting that thorough interest assessments
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Both OCR and the courts have been attacked for what many believe to
be too great a reliance on the proportionality prong of the three-part test.74
Perhaps the appeal of that standard lies in its simplicity: one merely adds up
the number of female athletes,75 determines the percentage of athletes who
are women, and compares that percentage to the percentage of women in the
overall student population. A difficult issue remains, of course, as to what
level of disparity is "substantial,, 76 but in many respects, this mathematical
exercise still is much easier to contend with than are the ambiguities inher-
ent in prongs two and three. Nonetheless, the same forces that prodded OCR
to issue its recent Clarification also demand a more thorough explication of
each of the standards in the three-part test in order to determine if more than
an illusory alternative to strict proportionality exists.
This Article now addresses each of the three standards in light of the
case law and OCR's pronouncements. Although considerable harmony exists
among the court opinions, the law is not well-settled. Only a few gender
equity cases have been decided, and those most often cited as the leading
"would do little more than overcomplicate an already complex equation" and would
"aggravate the quantification problems that are inevitably bound up with Title IX"). The
Cohen court opted instead for "a relatively simple assessment" under prong three by
inquiring into "whether there is unmet need in the underrepresented gender." Id. This
formulation will cut heavily against the institution if female plaintiffs seek the reinstate-
ment of a previously viable team. The courts also have recognized that the issues under
prong three will be considerably more "vexing" in a case in which female plaintiffs
seek to create a new team. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
' For a small but representative sample, see Ross, supra note 8, at 144 (quoting
Fred Heinrich, counsel for'University of Illinois in Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d
265 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a reverse discrimination claim brought by male swimmers
whose team was eliminated), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995), decrying OCR's
"numbers game"); Kocher, supra note 4, at 4 (contending that despite "disingenuous
claims to the contrary," OCR relies on "strict proportional gender quotas [as] the only
valid measure of Title IX compliance"); Ronald D. Mott, OCR Still Analyzing Respons-
es; Hopes to Announce Guidelines Soon, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 6, 1995, at 1 (reporting
the College Football Association's and two members of Congress' objections to a per-
ceived overemphasis on proportionality).
75 Note that the test speaks of "participation opportunities." See infra text accompa-
nying notes 82-84.
76 The Policy Interpretation does not define "substantial," and the OCR Clarification
does not provide much guidance. Although the Clarification provides examples in
which the size of the athletics program appears to be significant, the bottom line is that
substantial proportionality "depends on the institution's specific circumstances" and,
thus, must be determined "on a case-by-case basis." OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note
17, at 4. To date, the definition of substantial proportionality has not been a particularly
pressing issue because schools generally have had such large statistical disparities. It
remains to be seen what view OCR or the courts will take of a school in which, for
example, 50% of the students are female, and 45% or 48% of the athletes are female.
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cases-Cohen v. Brown University,77 Roberts v. Colorado State Board of
Agriculture,7 and Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania79 -all in-
volved a narrow factual scenario in which the university defendant sought
either to eliminate or to downgrade an existing varsity women's team. Cer-
tainly an assessment of a school's "accommodation of interests and abili-
ties" takes on a unique dimension when a school cuts a viable women's
team. In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,"° however, the court con-
sidered a request by female athletes to add new teams to the existing
women's program and "most emphatically" rejected one of the principal
tenets of the other courts' analyses.81
A. Part One: Proportionaliiy
Part one of OCR's three-part test focuses strictly on numbers. It asks
whether the number of female athletes at the school is "substantially propor-
tionate" to the number of women in the student body. In other words, part
one suggests that if females make up fifty percent of the overall student
population, ideally fifty percent of the athletes should be female as well. As
indicated previously, an assessment of a school's compliance with this test
is a matter of simple mathematics. Before a school's compliance can be
determined, however, two definitional hurdles must be cleared: (1) who is
an "athlete"; and (2) what constitutes "substantial" proportionality?
The proportionality test speaks in terms of "participation opportuni-
ties." 2 In its recent Clarification, OCR declared that it determines the
number of participation opportunities by using a longstanding definition of
"participants" set forth in the Policy Interpretation. 3 The Policy Interpreta-
tion defines "participants" as those athletes:
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored sup-
port normally provided to athletes competing at the
institution involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medi-
cal and training room services, on a regular basis
during a sport's season; and
991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). The First Circuit recently issued a second opinion in
Cohen, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S.
Apr. 21, 1997), but it relied substantially on its 1993 opinion. See supra note 51. Thus,
this Article focuses on the 1993 opinion.
71 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).81 Id. at 913.
82 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
83 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 3.
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b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions
and other team meetings and activities on a regular
basis during a sport's season; and
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists main-
tained for each sport, or
d. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above
but continue to receive financial aid on the basis of
athletic ability.'
The Clarification also makes clear that walk-ons (nonscholarship athletes)
and those who practice but do not compete (presumably including
redshirts85) are included as athletic participants for purposes of the three-
86part test.
One would think that because the definition of participants is so critical
to determining proportionality, use of the term would generate many ques-
tions, such as the following: Is it appropriate to include athletes who cannot
compete due to either redshirt status or injury? In light of the substantial
gender gap in the numbers of walk-ons, 7 should male and female walk-ons
be treated differently? Is it proper to focus exclusively on varsity teams, or
should participation rates include club and intramural athletes?'
Despite its seeming importance, this part of OCR's analysis has spawned
little comment.8 9 Perhaps this is because fine-tuning of the counting pro-
84 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
85 A redshirt is an enrolled student athlete who practices with an intercollegiate team
but does not engage in intercollegiate competition during the year, thereby saving a year
of eligibility. Under NCAA rules, a student athlete is limited to four seasons of intercol-
legiate competition in any given sport and five years within which to complete that
competition. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 1996-97 NCAA MANUAL art.
14.2, at 160 (1996) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
86 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 3.
87 Male walk-ons are common, but talented female athletes "generally are not inter-
ested in walking on and sitting on somebody's bench" because they usually have schol-
arship and playing opportunities elsewhere. Ross, supra note 8, at 138 (quoting Karol
Kahrs, Associate Director of Athletics, University of Illinois).
' See Thro & Snow, supra note 56, at 627 (decrying a continued focus on "elite"
athletes, while "the overwhelming majority of students who may wish to participate...
but are incapable of playing on the intercollegiate level" are ignored). Cf Farrell, supra
note 4, at 1051 ("Would not the interests of female students be better served by less
emphasis on competitive intercollegiate athletics for a relatively few very talented ath-
letes and more emphasis on, and funding for, aerobics and dance classes, physical edu-
cation classes, and intramural sports?").
89 One exception is the district court's second opinion in the Cohen litigation, in
which the court defined "participation opportunities" as the "actual participants on
intercollegiate teams." Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 202 (D.R.I. 1995),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321,
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cess would have little effect on the outcome of most compliance reviews,
for the simple reason that wide gender disparities have been and remain
common at most institutions.9" Moreover, many observers' attention has
been diverted by a much larger counting issue: should football players be
included in determining the number of athletic participants?
Those who are unfamiliar with Title IX issues probably would be per-
plexed that this question has been posed. Nonetheless, since Title IX's en-
actment, a notion has persisted that football's unique character justifies spe-
cial treatment, if not an outright exemption from gender equity require-
ments.91 Since OCR and the courts have begun to focus on proportionality
as the key to compliance, the issue has assumed even greater significance.
Because of football squads' large sizes, some commentators question wheth-
er proportionality is possible at a school that maintains a football pro-
gram.92 Conversely, many schools that do not satisfy the proportionality
standard would do so if football were excluded from the equation. 93
Current NCAA rules allow eighty-five scholarships and a squad size of
one hundred five for Division I-A football programs.' Because the sport
has no women's counterpart, participation rates for college athletics inevita-
bly are skewed heavily in favor of men at most schools with a sizable foot-
ball program. To close that gap, schools essentially have two options: they
1997 WL 81992 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1997). The court considered and rejected the
university's suggestion that participation opportunities be determined either by "filled
and unfilled athletic slots" or by the sizes of NCAA travel squads. Id. at 203 & n.37.
Representative J. Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., who led the congressional effort in 1995 to
require OCR to clarify its Policy Interpretation, also submitted a recommendation to
OCR that it count "opportunity slots" as participants even if students did not fill those
slots. Title IX Ticker, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 5. Presumably, this method of
counting would narrow the gender gap by increasing the number of female "partici-
pants."
90 See supra text accompanying note 70.
91 Some commentators have referred derisively to this idea as the "three-sex theory"
of athletics-the sexes being men, women, and football players. E.g., Cynthia J. Harris,
Comment, The Reform of Women's Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Equal Protection,
and Supplemental Methods, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 709 (1991); Alexander Wolff, The
Slow Track, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1992, at 54; see also Loretta M. Lamar, To
Be an Equitist or Not. A View of Title IX, 1 SPORTS L.J. 237, 263 (1994) (referring to
"a three-way athletic department: the men's program, the women's program, and foot-
ball").
2 See Farrell, supra note 4, at 995; Catherine Pieronek, A Clash of Titans: College
Football v. Title IX, 20 J.C. & U.L. 351, 351 (1994).
9 Connolly & Adelman, supra note 61, at 910; Pieronek, supra note 92, at 352.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 85, art. 15.5.5.1, at 25 (scholarships), art.
17.11.2.1.1, at 307 (squad size). Division I-AA schools may award the equivalent of 63
scholarships, id. art. 15.5.5.2, at 25, and have a maximum squad size of 90, id. art.
17.11.2.1.2, at 307.
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can increase women's opportunities or make cuts in men's athletics pro-
grams.95 In tough budget times, the latter becomes the more attractive alter-
native, and most schools, when deciding which men's programs to cut,
adopt a hands-off posture toward "revenue-producing" sports,96 such as
football and men's basketball.97 That leaves lower-profile sports, such as
gymnastics, swimming, and wrestling, for the chopping block. Thus, both
supporters of low-profile men's sports and of high-profile sports (who fear
that their protection from the budget ax soon may expire) have strong incen-
tives to champion a football exemption from the proportionality standard.
A state court case, Blair v. Washington State University,98 considered
the football exemption in detail. In Blair, female athletes and coaches
brought suit under the Washington Constitution's Equal Rights Amendment
and under a state anti-discrimination statute.99 The trial court excluded
football players when calculating participation opportunities on the ground
that football was "unique in many respects,... [and] distinguishable from
all other collegiate sports."10" On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of
Washington rejected the argument that football's distinguishing characteris-
tics 0 ' warranted an exemption from the gender equity calculations: "It is
stating the obvious to observe the Equal Rights Amendment contains no
exception for football ... . The exclusion of football would prevent sex
equity from ever being achieved since men would always be guaranteed
many more participation opportunities than women .... ""
Likewise, Title IX contains no exception for football. Indeed, the battle
for a football exemption was fought, and lost, more than twenty years ago,
when Title IX's implementing regulations were promulgated. Despite intense
lobbying by the NCAA and others, Congress rejected an exemption for
revenue-producing sports. Congress instead opted for a mild admonition to
HEW to consider "the nature of particular sports" when drafting its final
9' This assumes the school will not eliminate athletics altogether, an alternative that
one court, remarkably, offered as a viable solution to the gender equity dilemma. Cohen
v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 993, 999 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1993).
9 Studies suggest that in light of the enormous expenses incurred in operating a
football program, few such programs truly generate net revenues. See infra notes 426-
28 and accompanying text.
9 See Blum, supra note 5, at A34.
98 740 P.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987).
99 Id. at 1380.
100 Id. at 1382-83.
101 The trial court in Blair stated that football's distinguishing characteristics include
"the number of participants, scholarships, and coaches, amount of equipment and facili-
ties, income generated, media interest, spectator attendance, . . . publicity generated for
the University as a whole," and its use of business principles to earn a profit. Id. at
1383.
102 Id. (citation omitted).
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regulations." 3 HEW's final regulations and OCR's Policy Interpretation
recognize the legitimacy of added expenditures for program components
such as equipment, facilities, and crowd management."°4 The existence of
those provisions, however, reinforces the absence of a football exemption.
It is simply too late to argue that football players should not be counted
in participation calculations. Not only is an exemption wrong from an equi-
table perspective," it also has no support in the law. OCR's Policy Inter-
pretation explicitly states that football is not to be excluded," and since
the first Blair decision,"° no court has even hinted at the possibility of an
exemption. Indeed, even the College Football Association (CFA), which his-
torically has been among the most vocal critics of OCR's enforcement ef-
forts," 8 has recognized the futility of an exemption argument. In a 1995
position paper on Title IX, the CFA stated unequivocally: "We DO NOT
seek exemption of football from Title IX."'
Thus, continued arguments for a football exemption seem hopelessly
outdated and futile. As the CFA has recognized, the courts and proponents
of a more forgiving compliance posture from OCR should instead concen-
trate on two issues that are in greater need of analysis: (1) how strict is the
proportionality standard; ahd (2) what role should proportionality play in
achieving the overall regulatory goal of accommodating student interests and
abilities?"'
OCR's Policy Interpretation states that men's and women's participation
opportunities should be "substantially proportionate to their respective en-
103 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
"o See John Gaal et al., HEW's Final "Policy Interpretation" of Title IX and Inter-
collegiate'Athletics, 6 J.C. & U.L. 345, 347 (1979-1980).
105 "After all, what kind'of law would [Title IX] be if it permitted discrimination as
long as you were making money at it?" George, supra note 6, at 568.
106 44 Fed. Reg. 71,421 (1979).
107 Blair v. Washington State Univ., No. 28816 (Super. Ct. for Whitman County Jan.
3, 1983) (choosing to exclude football in its calculations), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
740 P.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987) (holding in part that the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding football from its calculations).
108 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 3, at A35; Mott, supra note 74, at 1 (quoting CFA's
letter to OCR following the initial Clarification, which criticized OCR's perceived over-
emphasis on proportionality). The CFA will disband on June 30, 1997, following twenty
years as a potent football lobbying force. The CFA's board of directors voted the orga-
nization out of existence in May 1996, in part because of lagging support from several
major conferences. College Football Association Voted Out of Existence, NORMAN
TRANSCRIPT, June 2, 1996, at 24.
109 COLLEGE FOOTBALL Ass'N, POSITION ON TITLE IX (1995). The CFA contends it
seeks "practical and reasonable interpretations and guidelines from OCR to eliminate
colleges and universities from becoming prisoners to a strict proportionality test." Id.
110 See id.
19961
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rollments, ' "' but it does not define "substantiality." Therefore, what little
guidance schools have had in their voluntary compliance efforts has come
either from tales of OCR compliance reviews at other institutions, from
OCR's recent Clarification, or from a handful of recent court decisions.
1 2
None of these sources are very helpful in determining the definition of sub-
stantial proportionality.
Until relatively recently, OCR Was quite tolerant of disparities between
student enrollment and athletic participation." 3 The district court in Cohen,
for example, conceded that in 1989 OCR found two universities, the Univer-
sity of Nebraska at Lincoln and the University of Arkansas, in compliance
with the effective accommodation requirement despite sizable dispari-
ties."4 In 1989, OCR also found Colorado State University in compliance,
but after the university's female athletes took their case to court in
1993," ' the federal district judge concluded that "[w]ith all due respect" to
OCR," 6 the school was in violation of Title IX despite a smaller disparity
than that which existed in 1989."' In fact, OCR's perceived laxity in en-
forcing Title IX mandates in the 1980s has prompted gender equity lawsuits
at many schools during recent years.1
... 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
12 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (granting a prelimi-
nary injunction), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185
(D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1997); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Favia v. Indiana
Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F.
Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996); see also Horner v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43
F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
113 Lamar Daniel, a former OCR investigator and co-author of the agency's Title IX
Athletics Investigator's Manual, stated that OCR never intended strict proportionality to
be determinative of Title IX compliance. Instead, OCR conceived proportionality as a
threshold inquiry, with the principal focus on the third prong of OCR's three-part test,
which considers accommodation of student interests and abilities. In Daniel's view, the
focus shifted in the 1990s from accommodation to proportionality due to the lobbying
of women's advocacy groups and the courts' adoption of proportionality as the key test
of compliance. Discussions of Title IX and Restructuring Captivate CFA Audience,
supra note 55, at 4.
114 Cohen v. Brown Univ.,.809 F. Supp. 978, 993 n.12 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d
888 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Thro & Snow, supra note 56, at 618 (discussing OCR's
tolerance of disparities at Metropolitan State College of Denver and Mercer University).
113 Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998" F.2d 824 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
116 Id. at 1516.
117 See id. at 1512.
118 See Harris, supra note 48, at 58-59; Blum, supra note 63, at A39 (quoting Ellen J.
Vargyas of the National Women's Law Center: "There's little to no faith that going to
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In May 1993, Norma V. Cantu was appointed the new head of OCR,
and one of her first pledges was to strengthen the agency's enforcement of
Title IX."9 Critics charge that OCR has implemented a new "get-tough"
policy by demanding strict, immediate proportionality 20 Yet OCR insists
that proportionality is given no more emphasis than either of the other two
prongs of the three-part test 2' and that even when applying the propor-
tionality standard, percentages are not dispositive:
The percentage is not the controlling factor. For example,
you could have a particular school that is quite small with a
differential perhaps of seven percent. But the disparity may
not in total number get up to [a] sufficient number of stu-
dents who could field a viable team. I don't believe it is
wise for us to get into terms of percentages. Those will vary
depending upon the kinds of schools you are talking
about.
122
This statement epitomizes OCR's difficulty in defining "substantially
proportionate" participation. On one hand, OCR has formulated its standard
in terms of percentages." On the other hand, OCR backs away from per-
centages and suggests that absolute numbers may be the key to compliance.
That theme is repeated in OCR's recent Clarification, which ties proportion-
ality to the size of the athletics program. OCR considers two hypothetical
institutions, each with women comprising fifty-two percent of the student
body and forty-seven percent of the athletes. 24 Although both institutions
have a five percent disparity between athletic participation and enrollment,
OCR with a complaint will get anything accomplished."); Debra E. Blum, Civil Rights
Office Urged to Heed Results of 2 Recent Sex-Bias Suits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept.
15, 1993, at A40 (quoting plaintiff in suit against Auburn University as asserting she
sued because of OCR's laxity).
119 Blum, supra note 63, at A39.
120 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 8, at 143 (quoting Karol Kahrs, Associate Director of
Athletics, University of Illinois, on OCR's "obstinate" attitude on the issue); Zapler,
supra note 9, at A44 (noting Eastern Illinois University's decision to drop wrestling and
men's swimming due to OCR's "inflexible" insistence on immediate proportionality).
12' According to OCR's recent Clarification, proportionality is simply one of "three
distinct ways to provide individuals of each sex with nondiscriminatory participation
opportunities," and the three-part test is designed to give institutions "flexibility and
control over their athletics programs." OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 12.
122 Mott, supra note 72, at 7 (quoting Mary Frances O'Shea, OCR's national coordi-
nator for Title IX athletics).
"2 From a mathematical perspective, it is difficult to address "proportionate" partici-
pation without using percentages.
12A OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 5.
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OCR states that a school with a large athletics program likely would not be
in compliance, yet a school with relatively few athletes probably would be
in compliance."z According to OCR, a five percent disparity at a large
school represents a substantial number of women whose athletic interests are
not being accommodated. A five percent disparity at a small school, howev-
er, may represent an insufficient number of unaccommodated women to
field a viable team.12
6
Unfortunately, OCR's attempt at clarification raises several unanswered
questions: Are absolute numbers more important than percentages? If the
focus is on numbers sufficient to support additional teams, is it sound to
assume that all "unaccommodated" women will be interested in playing a
particular sport? Is it even possible to assess proportionality without refer-
ence to the third prong of the three-part test? Indeed, hasn't OCR blurred
the line between the proportionality and accommodation prongs by high-
lighting raw numbers? Has OCR, through its examples, effectively estab-
lished standards for substantiality?
OCR's principal point in the Clarification regarding proportionality
seems to be that no bright-line rule exists for determining substantial pro-
portionality: "Because this determination depends on the institution's specif-
ic circumstances and the size of its athletic program, OCR makes this deter-
mination on a case-by-case basis, rather than through use of a statistical
test.' ' 127 OCR, however, may have inadvertently undermined that funda-
mental precept by including examples with specific figures. Because those
examples appear to offer concrete guidance, schools desperate for direction
may interpret them as edicts.
OCR's small-program example, with only sixty athletes in the school's
entire athletics program,'" seems atypical. 29 Therefore, many observers
will focus on the large-program example, involving six hundred athletes, 3 '
and will assume, based on OCR's statements, that a five percent disparity
will not pass muster. The only other guidance OCR provides in its Clarifi-
cation is the advice that institutions need not "fine tune" their athletic partic-
ipation rates to respond to "natural fluctuations in ... enrollment and/or
participation rates" from year to year.' That advice is instructive and
eminently sensible. Again, however, OCR's examples elucidating this basic
canon send an implicit message that only strict proportionality will suffice;
in both of its examples, OCR assumes that minor enrollment fluctuations
125 Id.
126 Id. at 4-5.
127 Id. at 4.
21 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 5.
129 Certainly such a school would not face the difficult problems a school with a
large football program faces. See supra text accompanying notes 89-110.
130 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 5.
131 Id. at 4.
[Vol. 5:1
GRAPPLING WITH GENDER EQUITY
occurred after the institution had achieved perfect proportionality.'32
OCR seems to be sending mixed signals. Although OCR professes to
minimize the significance of mathematical precision in assessing disparities
between athletic participation and enrollment, OCR's actions in recent com-
pliance reviews and its Clarification examples suggest that strict proportion-
ality is its lodestar.
Despite its clumsy effort, OCR's success in resisting the temptation to
establish a bright-line rule, whether it be five percent, two percent, or exact
proportionality, is commendable. Admittedly, an "it depends on the case"
standard'33 does not provide much guidance, but neither do numbers tell
the whole story. Each case will rest on its facts, particularly if proportionali-
ty is viewed in the larger and more meaningful context of accommodating
student interests and abilities.'34 Although a bright line is appealing, any
specific standard that OCR, the courts, or commentators could invent would
be arbitrary.'35
Certainly no meaningful measures exist to indicate, for example, that a
two percent deviation from exact proportionality represents more of a good
faith effort to provide equitable participation opportunities than a three per-
cent or five percent deviation. Moreover, the adoption of some de minimis
level of permissible disparity would undermine the goal of equal treatment
of the sexes. If schools were allowed to deviate from strict proportionality
by five percent, for example, they would strive for that arbitrary standard
rather than for true equality.'36
Despite these shortcomings, the clarity of the bright line has proven
enticing. In schools and athletic conferences around the country, gender
equity has become a numbers game, with progress measured against an
arbitrary numerical goal. The University of Texas settled a Title IX suit by
agreeing to increase athletic opportunities for women until they made up at
least forty-four percent of the school's varsity athletes.'37 In a sweeping
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 The strict separation of the prongs of OCR's three-part test is perhaps the most
troubling aspect of its application. See infra text accompanying notes 212-17, 291-92.
... See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 4, at 1041-42 (suggesting a five percent benchmark
based on court decisions, OCR pronouncements, and settlements between female plain-
tiffs and universities). One pair of commentators at least has suggested the use of statis-
tics rather than the kind of "eyeballing" some courts seem to employ. Connolly &
Adelman, supra note 61, at 894-95, 902-03 (suggesting a "two to three standard devia-
tion" test). In the final analysis, however, even a statistical test would be arbitrary.
136 See Harris, supra note 48, at 84-85. Cf Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538
(1969) (Fortas, J., concurring) (noting, in the reapportionment context, that "a de mini-
mis rule of allowable disparities tends to demean in theory and in practice the constitu-
tional objective [that each person's vote should carry equal weight] because it suggests
that it is not necessary even to aim at equality").
137 Debra E. Blum, U. of Texas at Austin Settles Sex-Bias Suit by Doubling Women's
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agreement, the California State University System settled a suit brought by
the state chapter of the National Organization for Women by promising to
narrow the gap between women's athletic participation and enrollment to
five percent.138  For Virginia Tech, the magic number was three
percent.'39 The Big Ten Conference joined in with a conference-wide com-
mitment to a sixty percent-forty percent male-female split in athletic partici-
pation. 4
Although these examples represent headway toward increased athletic
opportunities for women, they also illustrate the capriciousness of the quest
for "substantial" proportionality. In the absence of meaningful guidance
from OCR, schools are left to formulate their own definitions of the term.
The result is an apparent random selection of maximum disparity figures.
Exacerbating this situation is a lack of direction from the courts. Schools
facing the threat of litigation ultimately must predict how a court will judge
their athletics programs and tailor their remedial actions accordingly. At
present, however, such predictions are precarious because most applicable
judicial precedent includes little thoughtful analysis.
The first court to address the proportionality prong of OCR's three-part
test was the federal district court in Cohen.' The judge in Cohen devoted
one short paragraph of his opinion to the application of the substantial pro-
portionality test and concluded that Brown University failed to meet the
standard. The judge noted that women comprised 48.2% of the student body
but only 36.6% of varsity athletes. 4 1 "Thus," concluded the court without
further comment, "Brown fails to satisfy the first question."'43 Six weeks
later, the federal district court in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylva-
nia144 likewise dispatched the proportionality issue in a single paragraph,
Sports Opportunities, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 28, 1993, at A33 (noting that the
settlement "put Texas out in front" in embracing proportionality).
13 Debra E. Blum, Big Step for Sex Equity, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Oct. 27, 1993,
at A35. Following the settlement, a state senator withdrew his bill which would have re-
quired no more than a two percent disparity at California state universities. Id.
139 Debra E. Blum, Virginia Tech Will Add 2 Women's Sports to Settle Suit, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 24, 1995, at A40. The Virginia Tech suit was brought by women
seeking to elevate club sports to varsity status. At the time of the suit, a seven percent
disparity existed. Id.
140 See Jennifer L. Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commit-
ment to Fairness, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 133, 151-52 (1995).
141 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993). Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), was decided three months earlier than Cohen, but in Cook, the
court focused primarily on treatment disparities between the men's and women's hock-
ey teams and did not specifically address proportionality.
142 Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
143 Id.
144 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
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supporting its conclusion with only a recitation of the enrollment and athlet-
ic participation rates. 4 Subsequent opinions on proportionality in these
cases were equally unenlightening.
4 6
Roberts v. Colorado State University'47 is the lone exception to courts'
generally brief analysis of the proportionality prong of OCR's three-part
test. The trial court in Roberts at least pondered the definition of substantial-
ity and identified several sources to which it looked for guidance. In con-
cluding that the university did not meet the "substantial proportionality" test,
the court found four factors persuasive: (1) a hypothetical example from the
OCR Investigator's Manual involving perfect proportionality; (2) a 1983
Statement of Findings issued to the university by OCR, indicating that dis-
parities of 7.5%, 12.5%, and 12.7% for the three years under review (1980-
1983) were too large; (3) a statistics expert's testimony that the university's
10.5% disparity was "statistically significant"; and (4) a comparison to
Brown University's 11.6% disparity in Cohen.14' The appellate court in
Roberts accepted the district court's analysis and added only that "substan-
tial proportionality entails a fairly close relationship between athletic partic-
ipation and undergraduate enrollment."'49
Roberts is more illuminating than other courts' opinions,5 but' it is
hardly a model of clarity and direction. The phrase "fairly close relation-
ship" has no more substance than does "substantially proportionate." Nor are
the sources of guidance the courts drew upon in Roberts particularly persua-
145 See id. at 584-85. Admittedly, the disparity in Favia was relatively large, primari-
ly because of the large percentage of women in the student population (55.61%). Prior
to athletics program cuts, women made up 37.77% of the intercollegiate athletes; fol-
lowing the cuts, the percentage dropped to 36.51%. Id.
146 Affirming the district court's ruling in Cohen, the First Circuit devoted one sen-
tence to the issue. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903 ("[W]e adopt the lower court's record-
rooted finding.., because [the University] offered too few varsity opportunities for
women."). On remand, the district court acknowledged that substantiality was "neces-
sarily an elusive concept" and offered a new, less-than-helpful definition: a school's
athletic program must "mirror[] the student enrollment as closely as possible." Cohen,
879 F. Supp. at 201-02. In applying that standard, the court again simply recited the
numbers (38.13% female athletes, 51.14% female enrollment) and stated that the result-
ing 13.01% disparity was too high. Id. at 211. The appellate court in Favia did not
reach the issue due to the unique procedural context (reviewing a denial of a motion to
modify a preliminary injunction). See Favia, 7 F.3d at 334-35.
141 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Roberts v.
Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004
(1993).
14s Id. at 1512-13.
149 Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
150 In addition to Cohen and Favia, see Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No. 93-CV-1029,
1996 WL 328446, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996) (denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment partly because of a 13.2% disparity).
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sive. The first is a statement in the OCR Investigator's Manual: "If the
results are substantially proportionate (for example, if the enrollment is 52%
male and 48% female, then, ideally, about 52% of the participants in the
athletics program should be male and 48% female), the recipient is effec-
tively accommodating the interests and abilities of both sexes..... Apart
from the ambiguity inherent in the use of the word "about," this statement
purports to define the ideal, which has little relevance to the vast majority of
schools whose participation and enrollment rates are far from perfectly pro-
portionate. Moreover, as the district court in Roberts observed, the OCR
Investigator's Manual immediately follows this statement with a renuncia-
tion of numerical standards: "There is no set ratio that constitutes 'substan-
tially proportionate' or that, when not met, results in a disparity or a viola-
tion. All factors for this program component, and any justifications for dif-
ferences offered by the institution, must be considered before a finding is
made."' 52
Also curious in Roberts is the trial and appellate courts' reliance on a
Statement of Findings OCR issued in 1983. In 1989, OCR terminated its
monitoring of Colorado State's athletics program by referring to the
university's "good faith efforts to increase athletic opportunities for female
student athletes."' 53 At the time, the disparity between athletic participation
and enrollment was significantly larger than it was in 1983.' This fact
alone reinforces OCR's longstanding view that deviation percentages are a
poor measure of Title IX compliance.'55 It also makes one wonder why the
district court in Roberts relied on OCR's 1983 pronouncements when, in the
same case, the court forcefully repudiated later OCR actions.'56
The trial court in Roberts also cited a statistics expert's testimony that
the university's disparity was statistically significant, that is, "the disparities
between women's enrollment and athletic participation rates at CSU over the
last decade could not have occurred merely by chance."'57 Although the
use of statistics perhaps is better than simple "eyeballing,"'58 the
statistician's conclusions in Roberts seem both self-evident and of little
utility in providing a general definition of substantial proportionality. Recall
also that OCR has explicitly eschewed the use of statistical tests in applying
its substantiality standard.'59
5 Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512 (quoting the OCR INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra
note 55, at 24).
152 Id.
113 Id. at 1516.
154 See id. at 1512.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
156 See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516.
157 Id. at 1513.
151 Connolly & Adelman, supra note 61, at 902-03.
159 See supra text accompanying note 127.
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Finally, the courts in Roberts compared Colorado State's 10.5% dispari-
ty with the 11.6% disparity found unacceptable in Cohen.160 Both the trial
court's and the appellate court's barren juxtaposition of the two disparity
figures, without any further comment or explanation, 61 leaves one with the
impression that indeed the courts were "eyeballing": the courts in Cohen
found an 11.6% disparity to be too high; 10.5% is not much lower; there-
fore, 10.5% is unacceptable as well. Not only is this an uninspired analysis,
but it perpetuates an unhealthy fixation on pure numbers and artificially
establishes a new maximum disparity benchmark.'62
Thus, Roberts adds little to the other cases that have attempted to inter-
pret the meaning of "substantial proportionality." The result is that neither
OCR nor the courts have given schools meaningful guidance in this area.
Indeed, OCR's repeated assertion that the proportionality determination
"depends on the institution's specific circumstances" and that "OCR makes
this determination on a case-by-case basis"'63 highlights the fact that sub-
stantial proportionality "is necessarily an elusive concept."'" In light of
that elusiveness, an overemphasis on proportionality seems inappropriate.
Despite OCR's insistence that student interests and abilities may be
accommodated by satisfying any one of the three-part test's prongs,'65 the
proportionality prong has assumed a position of prominence. In fact, the
structure of the test itself emphasizes proportionality. The proportionality
prong is the first of the three prongs, and the test suggests that one should
not consider either of the other two prongs until after examining proportion-
ality. Prongs two and three are triggered only if "the members of one sex
have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes,"'' 66 that
"6 See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513; Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
809 F. Supp. 978, 991 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), on remand,
879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1997).
161 See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1513; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
162 Several commentators have embraced this comparison game as well. See, e.g.,
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d
155 (1st Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2205) (arguing that Brown's 13.01% disparity was too high
because the courts in Roberts found 10.5% insufficient); Crawford & Strope, supra note
46, at 564 (asserting that the Big Ten Conference's plan to increase women's athletic
opportunities to 40%, which is a 10% disparity if one assumes there is 50% female
enrollment in the conference, is inadequate in light of "recent court rulings"); Pieronek,
supra note 92, at 369 ("Roberts v. Colorado State University points out that the 10%
differential that would result from the [Big Ten's] 60-40 proposal does not satisfy the
Substantial Proportionality Test.").
163 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 4.
164 Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 201.
165 See supra text accompanying notes 68, 121.
166 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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is, when proportionality does not exist. Moreover, in recent compliance
reviews, OCR appears to have put the primacy of proportionality into prac-
tice."'
The courts have taken this concept a step further. The most prominent
gender equity decision is the First Circuit's opinion in Cohen, which char-
acterized proportionality as a "safe harbor" for institutions. 6 ' Elaborating,
the court asserted that "a university which does not wish to engage in exten-
sive compliance analysis may stay on the sunny side of Title IX simply by
maintaining gender parity between its student body and its athletic line-
up."' 69 Following Cohen's lead, the Tenth Circuit in Roberts and the Sixth
Circuit in Homer v. Kentucky High School Athletic Association7 ' explicit-
ly adopted the safe harbor approach.'7'
At one level, the notion of proportionality as a safe harbor is unremark-
able. Assuming that the First Circuit in Cohen was referring only to the
accommodations component of Title IX compliance and not the separate
"treatment" issues, 7 2 the safe harbor analysis really is nothing more than a
reiteration of OCR's position that "[i]f an institution has met any part of the
three-part test, OCR will determine that the institution is meeting [the effec-
tive accommodation] requirement.' If this is true, do prongs two and
three provide equally safe harbors? They should, if OCR means what it
says.
Nonetheless, some courts have conferred an exalted status on the propor-
tionality prong by reserving to it the safe harbor label, while simultaneously
relegating prongs two and three to a backup role. For example, the appellate
court in Cohen clearly suggested that "gender balance" is the key to compli-
ance, conceding only that under the right circumstances, the second and
third prongs might serve as a "satisfactory proxy" for proportionality. 174
167 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
168 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993).
169 Id. at 897-98.
'70 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
171 See Homer, 43 F.3d at 275; Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824, 829 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). The Third Circuit did not
reach this issue in Favia v. Indiana University of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993), be-
cause of the case's unique procedural context (reviewing a denial of a motion to modify
a preliminary injunction). In Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994),
the Seventh Circuit favorably noted the safe harbor approach, id. at 271, but its opinion
is somewhat cryptic because it also refers to proportionality as creating only a "pre-
sumption" of compliance. Id. at 268, 270, 271.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50. Surely proportionality alone will not
keep an institution "on the sunny side of Title IX" if it is discriminating in one of the
other two compliance categories.
173 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 2,(emphasis added).
174 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993).
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The district court in Cohen referred to the second and third prongs as "es-
cape routes," to be considered only if a school does not meet the proportion-
ality standard.175 In a subsequent opinion,'76 the district court in Cohen
suggested an even more limited role for prongs two and three: "[T]he
[three-part] test encourages equality but recognizes that some institutions
may be unable to attain this goal through no fault of their own; in these
cases, the test provides alternatives to statistical parity.""
Recent developments, however, may indicate that proportionality is
developing chinks in its armor. One very significant development is con-
gressional involvement in the gender equity debate, which led to OCR's
clarification of its three-part standard. In May 1995, at the urging of a coali-
tion of men's coaching organizations," a House of Representatives com-
mittee held a hearing to address the manner in which both OCR and the
courts had been enforcing Title IX mandates. 79 Much of the debate at that
hearing centered around a perceived overemphasis on proportionality.'
Some witnesses urged Congress to intervene by amending Title IX, but,
instead, OCR and Congress compromised; Congress agreed to remain on the
sidelines if OCR agreed to clarify its enforcement policies.'
In September 1995, OCR issued an initial draft of its Clarification."2
During the thirty-day comment period that followed, the agency received
234 comments, including many that criticized OCR for failing to strengthen
prongs two and three.'83 OCR's final Clarification, issued in January 1996,
differed little from the initial draft,"M and it is unlikely to appease those
who had originally pressed for congressional involvement. Because the
'7' Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 991 (D.R.I. 1992), affid, 991 F.2d 888
(lst Cir. 1993).
176 In the first Cohen opinion, the district court issued a preliminary injunction
against Brown University. The district court's second opinion followed a trial on the
merits. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 187-88.
17 Id. at 199. The court did not explain when an institution would be unable to
achieve substantial proportionality "through no fault of [its] own." See id.
"" The primary movers were representatives of coaching associations of nonrevenue
sports, such as gymnastics, swimming, and wrestling. Ronald D. Mott, OCR Title IX
Clarification Receives Mixed Reviews, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 9, 1995, at 1. These coaches
viewed the use of a proportionality test in the enforcement of Title IX as a threat to the
very existence of their sports. See infra text accompanying notes 397-401.






"s Ronald D. Mott, Title IX Clarification Statement Varies Little from September
Draft, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at 1.
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critic's pleas have generated empathy from 134 members of Congress,"
the specter of congressional intervention again looms on the horizon, partic-
ularly if OCR and the courts continue to emphasize strict proportionali-
ty. 186
OCR's Clarification is simply a clarification, not a reevaluation of the
three-part test. In a letter accompanying the final Clarification, Norma V.
Cantu, the Assistant Secretary of OCR, reaffirmed the integrity of the test
itself and cautioned readers not to view the Clarification as second-guessing
that test.'87 She wrote that the three-part test "has guided OCR's enforce-
ment in the area of athletics for over 15 years, enjoying the bipartisan sup-
port of Congress... [and] the support of every court that has addressed
issues of Title IX athletics."'"
Ironically, four days before OCR released its Clarification, a Louisiana
federal district judge issued an opinion that questioned one of the three-part
test's fundamental premises. In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,"9
Judge Rebecca F. Doherty asked whether proportionality was an appropriate
measure of an institution's accommodation of student interests and abili-
ties.' Judge Doherty's question lies at the heart of another significant de-
velopment-the apparent unraveling of judicial Solidarity on the importance
of proportionality and its safe harbor status.
As mentioned above, the federal appellate courts in Cohen, Roberts, and
Homer all adopted the safe harbor analysis. 1' Judge Doherty, however,
declined "most emphatically" to follow suit:
This Court is not unaware of the Roberts, Cohen and
Homer holdings and, in fact, the explicit language ... that
one "may stay on the sunny side of Title IX simply by main-
taining gender parity between its student body and its athletic
lineup." The Fifth Circuit has not spoken to this issue and
this Court is not bound by Roberts, Cohen and Homer.
Further, this Court finds those decisions erroneous in this
regard. To accept the interpretation in Roberts, Cohen and
185 See supra note 16.
'8 See Mott, supra note 74, at 7 (quoting a letter written to OCR by two members of
the House subcommittee that had convened the May 1995 hearing following OCR's
release of a draft of its Clarification: "Our reading of the policy clarification indicates a
continuing overemphasis on a strictly defined concept of proportionality . . ").
187 Letter from Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, Dep't
of Educ., to Colleagues (Jan. 16, 1996); see also Mott, supra note 184, at 1.
"' Letter from Norma V. Cantu, supra note 187; see also Mott, supra note 184 at
19.
189 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
"9o See idt at 913-14.
'9' See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
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Homer, ... one must assume that interest- and ability to
participate in sports is equal as between all men and women
on all campuses. For instance, if a university has 50% fe-
male students and 50% male students, the assumption, under
this argument must follow that the same percentage of its
male population as its female population has the ability to
participate and the interest or desire to participate in sports at
the same competitive level. A review of Roberts, Cohen and
Horner finds no evidence to prove or disprove this assump-
tion ....
Without some basis for such a pivotal assumption, this
Court is loathe to join others in creating the "safe harbor" or
dispositive assumption for which defendants and plaintiffs
argue. Rather, it seems much more logical that interest in
participation and levels of ability to participate as percentag-
es of the male and female populations will vary from campus
to campus and region to region and will change with time.
To assume, and thereby mandate, an unsupported and static
determination of interest and ability as the cornerstone of the
analysis can lead to unjust results.192
The Pederson opinion clearly strays from the judicial party line. Its
persuasive force is tempered, however, by the fact that the court's discus-
sion of the safe harbor concept was unnecessary to the disposition of the
case. By definition, the "safe harbor" protects only those schools in com-
pliance with Title IX after the school has achieved substantial proportionali-
ty. Louisiana State University was no. different from the vast majority of its
peer institutions; immense disparities existed between men's and women's
athletic opportunities,1 93 so the university could not begin to make a credi-
ble claim of substantial proportionality. Thus, the court's quarrel over pro-
portionality as a safe harbor was dictum.'94
In light of the disparities common at most schools, the real issue is
192 Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14 (footnotes omitted).
19 Women comprised 49% of the student population but -only 29% 6f the school's
intercollegiate athletes. Id. at 915.
4 The safe harbor discussions in Cohen, Roberts, and Horner also were dicta be-
cause the courts in those cases likewise concluded that the institutions involved had not
met the proportionality standard. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43
F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir.
1993), on remand, 879 F. Supp. 185, 202 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in part, rev'd in part, 101
F.3d 155, 178 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S. Apr.
21, 1997); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1517-18 (D. Colo.),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom., Roberts v. Colorado State: Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824, 829 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
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whether a lack of substantial proportionality alone suffices to find an institu-
tion in noncompliance with Title IX. This is the question that has raised the
hackles of those who believe that OCR and the courts have transformed
Title IX analysis into a one-dimensional proportionality probe. For example,
in Pederson, the plaintiffs argued that proportionality was dispositive on the
flip side of the safe harbor; that is, "if numerical proportionality is not
found, the [institution] should be found to be in violation of Title IX."' 95
The court in Pederson rejected that reasoning, but it is remarkable that the
plaintiffs chose to make that argument. Despite practices that might indicate
otherwise, OCR repeatedly has insisted that an institution's failure to meet
the proportionality standard is not determinative. 96 The same is true for
those courts that have drawn fire for overemphasizing proportionality. For
example, the First Circuit in Cohen emphasized that "a court assessing Title
IX compliance may not find a violation solely because there is a disparity
between the gender composition of an educational institution's student con-
stituency, on the one hand, and its athletic programs, on the other hand."'97
Interestingly,. that comment from Cohen represented the court's interpre-
tation of a Title IX provision that explicitly addresses the concept of propor-
tionality. Section 1681(b) of the statute reads:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section [the basic
anti-discrimination mandate] shall be interpreted to require
any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate
treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbal-
ance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity,
in comparison with the total number or percentage of per-
sons of that sex in any community, State, section, or other
area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under
this chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such
an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or
receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by
the members of one sex.198
This provision can be interpreted in different ways. One commentator
has suggested that the "community, State, section, or other area" language
refers only to geographic areas and does not include university "communi-
195 Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913 (emphasis added).
196 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
'9' Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895.
198 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).
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ties."'99 Thus, according to this interpretation, the statute would not con-
demn comparisons "within the same institution.' '200 This view, however,
seems exceedingly narrow in light of several ordinary definitions of the
word "community."'
Assuming section 1681(b) reaches comparisons within academic com-
munities, that section certainly suggests a congressional distaste for propor-
tionality as a determinative factor in Title IX compliance. Consequently, the
court in Pederson used section 1681(b)'s language to further support its
rejection of the safe harbor concept. Noting first that "the jurisprudential
emphasis on numerical 'proportionality' is not found within the statute or
the regulations,""2 2 Judge Doherty focused on what little guidance Con-
gress did provide in the statute. She concluded that section 1681(b)'s "clear
language" prohibited OCR's use of a safe harbor: "[T]o the extent that the
Policy Interpretation [OCR's three-part test] suggests by use of the disjunc-
tive 'or' that a mere reliance upon substantial numerical proportionality
between the sexes suffices, it is contrary to the explicit language in 20
U.S.C. § 1681(b) ....
Unfortunately, the statutory language is not so clear. First, the proviso
included in section 1681(b) specifically proclaims that statistical disparities
can be relevant to the compliance determination.2' More important, how-
ever, is the language appearing before the proviso. A careful reading of the
statute indicates that section 1681(b) prohibits only one thing: that educa-
tional institutions be required by statistical imbalances to treat the sexes
differently.2 5 On its face, OCR's three-part test provides options; it does
not require proportionality, but simply allows schools to comply through
that method. °6 If prong one is not met, a school theoretically can comply
'9 Farrell, supra note 4, at 1038.
2 Id.
20 See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 267 (1984) (defining "com-
munity" as "a body of persons of common and esp. professional interests scattered
through a larger society <the academic community>")'
2 Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996).
203 Id.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994) ("Provided, That this subsection shall not be
construed to prevent the consideration ... of statistical evidence .. .
205 See id.
Nothing contained in subsection (a) ... shall be interpreted to require any
educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to ... one sex
on account of an imbalance . . . with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of that sex participating in or receiving [federal] benefits ... in compari-
son with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community,
State, section, or other area ....
Id.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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through prongs two or three.2" Thus, the concept of a safe harbor is not
directly contrary to section 1681(b).
The rub, of course, is whether OCR or the courts will provide schools
with a meaningful opportunity to comply through prongs two or three. In
effect, Judge Doherty has issued a challenge to her fellow jurists to live up
to their word. Their leading spokesperson, the three-judge appellate panel in
Cohen, has insisted that Title IX "does not mandate strict numerical equality
between the gender balance of a college's athletic program and the gender
balance of its student body."2' According to Cohen, to prevail in an ath-
letic discrimination suit, "a Title IX plaintiff ... must accompany statistical
evidence of disparate impact with some further evidence of discrimination,
such as unmet need amongst the members of the disadvantaged gender."'
Such statements are consistent with the framework of the three-part test. In
practice, however, when faced with a sizable statistical disparity, will the
courts really give serious attention to the other parts of the test? So far, the
signs are not particularly promising.21
Despite its flaws, Judge Doherty's opinion in Pederson serves as a tren-
chant reminder that Title IX's ultimate goal is to "effectively accommodate
[students'] interests and abilities"21' rather than to establish an abstract nu-
merical benchmark. Although other courts have blindly accepted the propo-
sition that proportionality is an appropriate surrogate for accommodation of
student interests and abilities, Judge Doherty simply was not willing to ac-
cept that proposition without supporting evidence.2" In Judge Doherty's
view, the critical inquiry was whether Louisiana State University had as-
sessed and met student desires and abilities, regardless of disparities be-
tween enrollment and athletic participation rates. 3 Judge Doherty asserted
that the "simplicity" of the safe harbor concept should not absolve athletic
directors from their Title IX duties to analyze the needs of their students and
to "fill[] those needs in a non-discriminatory fashion."214 Judge Doherty's
logic is persuasive, particularly in light of section 1681(b). Although that
207 Id.
208 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993).
209 Id. at 895.
210 See infra text accompanying notes 253-55, 298-321.
211 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1996).
212 Judge Doherty's position in Pederson has lifted the spirits of proportionality crit-
ics. See, e.g., Debra E. Blum, Measuring Equity: Federal Judge Rejects Common Test
Used in Title IX Disputes over Athletics, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26, 1996, at A34
(quoting Charles M. Neinas, Executive Director of the College Football Association:
"I'm encouraged that a federal judge recognizes the fallacy of using proportionality to
satisfy Title IX.").
213 See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 913-14 (M.D. La.
1996).
214 Id. at 914.
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provision may not forbid the use of a safe harbor, its principal thrust none-
theless downplays the significance of proportionality in the overall compli-
ance assessment.2 5
To further congressional objectives, OCR should modify its three-part
test to remove the disjunctive "or." The agency should consider all three
factors-proportionality, program expansion, and accommodation of student
interests and abilities-as integral parts of any comprehensive compliance
211review. Otherwise, the simplicity of proportionality will continue to se-
duce courts, OCR compliance officials, and institutions,217 and the other
two prongs will be virtually ignored. Perverse results may follow, because
the latter two prongs of the three-part test do not necessarily serve the same
goals as proportionality.
B. Part Two: Program Expansion
The second part of OCR's three-part test asks "whether the institution
can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interests and abilities of the
members of [the underrepresented] sex." '218 Several factors have combined
to marginalize the second prong in recent years,219 but OCR's recent Clar-
ification raises some interesting new questions and may actually breathe new
life into this part of the test.
The Clarification indicates that "OCR will review the entire history of
[an institution's] athletic program,""22 but a school's recent history clearly
is the most critical. Prong two states that an institution must show a "contin-
uing practice of program expansion," which means that a school is not in
215 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).
216 See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 914 ("[T]he proper analysis under effective accom-
modation ... allows for consideration of all factors listed [in the three-part test] in
determining whether the university has provided equal opportunity ... for males and
females.").
217 For example, in Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995), the court initially seemed uncomfortable with the notion
of a safe harbor, referring repeatedly to a "presumption" of compliance if a school met
the proportionality standard. Id. at 268, 270, 271. The court also recognized the need to
give schools "flexibility" in meeting Title IX mandates. Id. at 271. Ultimately, however,
the court's presumption became irrebuttable: "[l)t is only practical that schools be given
some clear way to establish that they have satisfied the requirements of the statute. The
substantial proportionality contained in Benchmark 1 merely establishes such a safe
harbor." Id. (emphasis added).
218 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
219 At least one commentator, who contends that prong two "was always a temporary
device," views it as essentially meaningless in the contemporary gender equity debate.
See Farrell, supra note 4, at 1043-44.
220 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 5.
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compliance if it rests only on teams established "at the initiation of its pro-
gram" for women." "In other words, efforts that were made during the
1970's or early 1980's are irrelevant." '222
Essentially, schools hoping to satisfy prong two will have to show tangi-
ble progress toward expanding women's athletic opportunities in the last
decade. Due to budgetary constraints, most schools have not been in an
expansion mode during that time. In fact, many schools have trimmed their
athletics program, as evidenced by the spate of litigation prompted by the
elimination or demotion of both men's and women's teams. 3 Thus, be-
cause "the typical.., school added many sports in the 1970's and early
1980's and has not added any in recent years,... most institutions would
fail the second prong."'
This analysis has been affirmed, in the courts, where a similar focus on
schools' "continuing" efforts to expand opportunities has left compliance
with prong two out of reach even for schools with a commendable historical
commitment to women's athletics. Brown University's experience provides a
good example. From 1971 through 1977, Brown established varsity pro-
grams in fourteen women's sports,' a remarkable and "dramatic"'
feat. The school added a fifteenth women's sport, indoor track, in 1982.27
For the next ten years, however, Brown added no new teams, so when fi-
nancial concerns prompted .cutbacks in both women's and men's pro-
grams2' and the University subsequently became a defendant in a gender
21 Id. (emphasis added).
Thro & Snow, supra note 56, at 624; see also Harris, supra note 48, at 87-89
(arguing against consideration of efforts in the 1970s).
See Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994) (four varsity
programs eliminated at University of Illinois), cert. denied, 115 S..Ct. 938 (1995); Favia
v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1993) (four varsity programs eliminat-
ed); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1993) (four varsity teams de-
moted to club status); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (S.D. Iowa
1995) (wrestling program eliminated); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp.
1507, 1514 (D. Colo.) (three varsity programs eliminated since 1986), aff'd in part,
rev'd in'part sub nom., Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
22 Thro & Snow, supra note 56, at 624; see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 ("[I]n an
era of fiscal austerity, few universities are prone to expand athletic opportunities. It is
not surprising, then, that schools more often than not attempt to .manage the rigors of
Title IX by ... meeting the third benchmark of the accommodation test.").
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892.
226 Id. at 903.
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 211 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S.
Apr. 21, 1997).
The university downgraded four sports from varsity to club status-women's
gymnastics and volleyball and men's golf and water polo. Id. at 187.
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equity suit, 9 the university could not show a continuing practice of in-
creasing women's participation opportunities. The university argued that
focusing on participation numbers alone was too limiting and that "program
expansion" could be measured in other ways." Contending that the uni-
versity had "the pre-eminent women's sports program in the country,""
Brown's attorneys pointed to the school's continued improvements in the
quality of its existing women's athletics program 2 and argued that the
percentage of women participating in athletics had increased after the cut-
backs because the cuts affected more men than women. 3
The district court conceded that Brown University had "an impressive
history of program expansion," but concluded that the university could not
show "a continuing practice of intercollegiate program expansion for wom-
en."2" The court in Cohen confirmed that prong two's focus was solely on
expansion of participation opportunities, so Brown's acknowledged improve-
ments in the treatment of existing women's teams were irrelevant. 5 The
court also rejected the university's contention that a program "expansion"
for women could be established through cuts in the men's athletics pro-
gram.
236
The appellate courts that have considered prong two have concurred
with the district court's analysis in Cohen. In Cohen, the First Circuit sug-
gested that Brown University deserved "appreciable applause" for its efforts
" The suit was brought on behalf of "all present and future Brown University wom-
en students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are de-
terred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown." Id.
' Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 991 (D.R.I. 1992), aft'd, 991 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1993).
" Douglas Lederman, A Key Sports-Equity Case, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Oct. 5,
1994, at A51. While this boast undoubtedly was self-serving, in light of the extensive
women's sports offerings at the university, it was not far off the mark.
2 Among other things, Brown highlighted an increase in the number and quality of
women's coaches and an increase in the level of competition afforded women's teams.
Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
" See id. at 981. The parties disagreed on the numbers of students affected by the
cutbacks, and ultimately the court concluded that since the late 1970s, the percentage of
women competing in athletics at Brown had "remained fairly constant." Ia& at 991; see
also Cohen, 879 F. Supp. 185, 211 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d
155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1997).
22 Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211.
15 See id. This position is consistent with OCR's recent Clarification, which states:
"Part two focuses on whether an institution has expanded the number of intercollegiate
participation opportunities provided to the underrepresented sex. Improvements in the
quality of competition, and of other athletic benefits, provided to women athletes, [are]
not considered under the three-part test. . . ." OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at
5 n.2 (emphasis added).
236 Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211.
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in the 1970s.237 In the final analysis, however, the university's failure to
add significantly to its offerings for women fell "far short of a continuing
practice of program expansion." '238 In Roberts v. Colorado State Board of
Agriculture,"' the Tenth Circuit likewise acknowledged Colorado State
University's "dramatic expansion of women's athletic opportunities during
the 1970s ''24 but concluded that to rely on those early developments
would "read[] the words 'continuing practice' out of this prong of the
test. ,,241
The court in Roberts also agreed with Cohen that a reduction in men's
opportunities does not constitute an expansion of women's opportunities:
"[T]he ordinary meaning of the word 'expansion' may not be twisted to find
compliance under this prong when schools have increased the relative per-
centages of women participating in athletics by making cuts in both men's
and women's sports programs.,1 2 This indisputable observation, however,
underscores the inconsistency between prongs one and two. Increasing the
"relative percentages of women participating in athletics" is precisely the
goal of prong one. 3 Indeed, as the court in Roberts recognized, if
women's athletic participation percentages were to increase to the point that
"men's and women's athletic participation rates become substantially pro-
portionate to their representation in the undergraduate population," compli-
ance with Title IX would be achieved.2
The contrast between prongs one and two is stark. Cutting programs to
equalize participation rates seems almost the antithesis of "program expan-
sion"245 for women under prong two. Such cuts do nothing to increase
opportunities for women.246 Yet men's program cuts often not only are ac-
" Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993).
238 Id.
239 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).





25 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
246 OCR recognized that fact in its Clarification:
OCR will not find a history and continuing practice of program expansion where
an institution increases the proportional participation opportunities for the
underrepresented sex by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented sex alone
or by reducing participation opportunities for the overrepresented sex to a propor-
tionately greater degree than for the underrepresented sex. This is because part
two considers an institution's good faith remedial efforts through actual program
expansion.
OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 7. Remarkably, one women's coach criticized
OCR for this policy statement, contending that schools should be able to show program
expansion solely by cutting men's teams. See Lederman, supra note 179, at A52 (quot-
[Vol. 5:1
GRAPPLING WITH GENDER EQUITY
cepted but are encouraged as a means to achieve proportionality under
prong one. In Roberts, the Tenth Circuit recognized that "in times of eco-
nomic hardship, few schools will be able to satisfy Title IX's effective ac-
commodation requirement by continuing to expand their women's athletic
programs. '"" The court, however, had a ready solution for "[f]inancially
strapped institutions" that had little hope of complying with prong two; the
court suggested that such institutions cut athletics programs until substantial
proportionality is achieved."4 The court in Roberts found support in the
First Circuit's Cohen opinion:
Title IX does not require that a school pour ever-increasing
sums into its athletic establishment. If a university prefers to
take another route, it can also bring itself into compliance
with the first benchmark of the accommodation test by sub-
traction and downgrading, that is, by reducing opportunities
for the overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities
stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing them to a
much lesser extent).249
One can hardly blame nonrevenue men's sports' coaches for running
scared in the face of such open judicial invitations to cut athletics pro-
grams."0 Nor can one blame those coaches for concluding that all compli-
ance roads eventually lead to proportionality.5" In effect, the courts have
stated, "We know institutions will not be able to meet prong two because
the money for program expansion is unavailable, but who needs prong two?
Proportionality under prong one is always attainable, even by the most 'fi-
nancially strapped' institutions, through program cuts." Astonishingly, one
court offered schools the option of achieving perfect proportionality by abol-
ishing their athletics programs entirely. 2
ing Kay Brechtelsbauer, softball coach at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale).
"7 Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
2 See id.
u Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898-99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993), quoted in
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 n.9.
' Moreover, OCR offers little comfort in its modest statement that "nothing in the
three-part test requires an institution to eliminate participation opportunities for men."
OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 12 (emphasis added).
"5 See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 179, at A52 (quoting letter to OCR from Stephen
P. Erber, associate athletic director at State University of New York at Binghamton and
secretary of the National Wrestling Coaches Association: "Your 'clarification' ... does
nothing to strengthen [prongs two and three]. Which leads us back to square one: pro-
portionality is, de facto, the only criterion used.").
252 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 993 (D.R.I. 1992), aft'd, 991 F.2d 888
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Even if an institution had the money to expand significantly its athletic
opportunities for women, prong two still operates in the shadow of prong
one. After all, because prong two focuses on a "continuing" practice of
program expansion, schools striving to comply with Title IX through this
avenue will have to continue expanding opportunities for women in the
future rather than "rest on their laurels." 3 How long must those efforts
continue? Arthur H. Bryant, Executive Director of the Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice and a prominent gender equity plaintiff's lawyer,"4 candidly
admitted that schools will not be safe from the threat of litigation until they
reach the safe harbor of proportionality: "[Elither participation rates have to
be proportionate to enrollment, or schools have to continue to add women's
teams where interest and ability exist until participation reaches proportion-
ality." 
5
At best, program expansion may be nothing more than a temporary
compliance tool for schools trying to buy time in their efforts to move to-
ward substantial proportionality. On the other hand, prong one establishes an
end in itself; apparently an institution that meets the proportionality standard
complies with Title IX even if women's athletic opportunities remained
steady, or even declined, during the previous years. Assume, for example,
that an institution like Brown University, which created a sizable women's
athletics program in the 1970s and early 1980s but added no more teams for
the next decade, 6 decided in the 1990s to eliminate either its football
team, several smaller men's teams, or a combination of men's teams and
comparatively smaller women's teams. Clearly, none of these actions would
constitute an "expansion" of the school's athletics program for women. If
the cuts reduced the percentage of male athletic participants to a level com-
parable to men's student enrollment, however, OCR and the courts would
herald the university's action as a victory for women's athletics even though
women's opportunities did not increase. Similarly, if this hypothetical school
were to maintain substantial proportionality in the future, it need not worry
about Title IX compliance even if it never provides further opportunities for
women.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that prong two alone also stands as
(1st Cir. 1993).
" See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903 (applauding Brown University for "supercharging" its
women's athletics program in the 1970s but criticizing it for "rest[ing] on its laurels"
throughout the 1980s).
"' Bryant served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Cohen. See id. at 891. Trial Law-
yers for Public Justice has provided counsel or acted as amicus curiae in several gender
equity lawsuits and has been credited with helping to reinstate women's athletics pro-
grams at several institutions through the threat of litigation. Title IX and Athletics: The
Plaintiff's View, 6 SYNTHESIS: LAW & POL'Y IN HIGHER EDUC. 435 (1994).
z Title IX and Athletics, supra note 254, at 435.
z Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892, 903.
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a viable compliance standard, how does a school establish a "continuing
practice of program expansion?" Unfortunately, case law provides little
guidance in answering that question. This is understandable, however, if one
considers the context in which courts have decided the gender equity cases.
In all of the major cases, the courts reviewed schools" elimination or demo-
tion of existing, vital women's teams. 7 Even Pederson v. Louisiana State
University58 fits this pattern. In Pederson, the plaintiffs sued to compel
the university to add a varsity women's softball team. 2 9 Critical to the
court's prong two analysis was the fact that in 1983 the university had dis-
banded a successful women's softball team, 'apparently without good rea-
son.' Thus, none of these cases provides a fitting test of what an institu-
tion must do to establish an "expansion" of its women's athletics program.
School officials, then, probably will have to obtain guidance from
OCR's 'recent Clarification. Consistent with the case law, OCR's examples
in the Clarification make clear one lesson: schools that eliminate existing
women's teams will be hard-pressed to show program expansion. In OCR's
first example, "Institution C" established seven women's teams in the mid-
1970s, added another team in 1984, upgraded 'a club team to varsity status
in 1990, and was implementing a plan to add yet another team in 1996.'
OCR would find that institution in compliance with prong two. 2 "Institu-
2 See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1993) (concerning
elimination of field hockey and gymnastics teams); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir.) (concerning elimination of fast-pitch softball
team), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 892
(1st Cir. 1993) (concerning demotion of gymnastics and volleyball teams from varsity
to club status).
Three other often-cited 'gender equity cases did not involve cuts of existing varsity
teams, but all three arose in unique conteXts, 'and the program expansion prong of
OCR's three-part test was barely addressed, if at all. Homer v. Kentucky High School
Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994), was brought by high school athletes seeking
to compel the state high school athletic association to add fast-pitch softball to its sanc-
tioned sports. The court cited the three-part test but, in light of the summary judgment
context, offered minimal analysis. See id. at 274-75. In Cook v. Colgate University, 802
F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), members
of a women's club ice hockey team sought an upgrade to varsity status, but the court
focused on disparate treatment between the women's and men's hockey teams and did
not address the three-part test. In Blair v. Washington State University, 740 P.2d 1379
(Wash. 1987), a suit generally challenging the' university's treatment of female athletes,
the court did not consider Title IX because the plaintiffs brought the suit under state
law.
258 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
9 Id. at 897. The court dismissed for lack of standing an accompanying claim for a
varsity women's soccer team. Id. at 907-08.
260 See id. at 915-16.
261 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 7.
262 Id.
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tion D" has a history similar to "Institution C," having established seven
women's teams in the 1970s and adding new teams in 1983 and 1991. 26'
"In 1993 [, however,] Institution D eliminated a viable women's team and a
viable men's team in an effort to reduce its athletic budget."'  Cutting the
men's team is immaterial because prong two addresses only program expan-
sion for the "underrepresented sex." Eliminating the women's team, howev-
er, proved decisive: Institution D does not comply with prong two because
"its only action since 1991 with regard to the underrepresented sex was to
eliminate a team for which there was interest, ability and available competi-
tion.,,265
Institution C's plan to add a women's team in the near future also dis-
tinguishes the two hypothetical schools, but it seems unlikely that this was
pivotal in OCR's analysis. The Clarification explicitly discounts the signifi-
cance of institutional "promises" to improve.266 The agency, however, ap-
pears to have taken care in its wording; it noted in two examples that
schools were "implementing a plan" to add a women's team.7 This lan-
guage suggests more than a mere promise and is consistent with an earlier
comment in the Clarification that an institution's "current implementation of
a plan of program expansion" is a significant factor.2 68
Thus, Institution C's expansion plan undoubtedly weighs in its favor, but
263 Id. at 7-8.
264 Id. at 8.
265 Id.
266 "OCR will not find that an institution satisfies part two ... where it merely prom-
ises to expand its program for the underrepresented sex at some time in the future." Id.
at 7. This position may represent a departure from OCR's past, in which it was criti-
cized for too often accepting as compliance a school's "'plans to make a plan."' Harris,
supra note 91, at 711 (quoting Ann M. Seha, The Administrative Enforcement of Title
IX in Intercollegiate Athletics, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 121, 168 (1984)); see also Ross, supra
note 8, at 140 (quoting Fred Heinrich, counsel for the University of Illinois, as saying
that OCR found the university in compliance with Title IX in 1981 based on promises
to expand its program in the future); Debra E. Blum, Civil-Rights Office Urged to Heed
Results of 2 Recent Sex-Bias Suits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 15, 1993, at A40
(noting May 1993 letter from OCR to Auburn University finding the university in com-
pliance with Title IX based on promise to add women's soccer the following year).
267 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 7, 8 (discussing Institutions C and F).
268 Id. at 6. Institutions do not always follow through on their plans, however. In
Pederson, Louisiana State University argued that its verbal commitment to add varsity
women's teams in softball and soccer demonstrated a continuing practice of program
expansion. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 916 (M.D. La. 1996).
The district court rejected the argument on the ground that the university had "not yet
lived up to its verbal commitment. Softball is not yet in competition, nor is this Court
convinced it will be in full and effective competition in 1996, as LSU claims; soccer is
operating under considerable handicaps which ... demonstrate LSU's inadequate com-
mitment to the team." Id.
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the difference in outcomes between Institutions C and D still appears to be
grounded. on the latter's elimination of a viable women's team. A school
with any history of reduction in its women's athletics program, even if moti-
vated by nondiscriminatory budget considerations, will have to make a
strong showing of overall program expansion. to overcome such an ac-
tion. 9 OCR's "Institution E" example indicates that such a showing can
be made, but the example does not offer hope to many schools. Institution E
established five women's teams in the 'mid-1970s, added another in 1979,
and in 1984, it upgraded a twenty-five-member club team to varsity status
while simultaneously eliminating another eight-member varsity women's
team.270 The institution then added new women's teams in 1987, 1989, and
1995, and in the late 1980s it increased the size of an existing team.27' Ex-
cepting a minor aberration in 1984 (that still resulted in a net gain of seven-
teen varsity women's opportunities), this institution has an exceptionally
strong record of program expansion. OCR recognized that record and con-
cluded that the school would comply with prong two.272
OCR wisely attempted to avoid bright line rules in its elucidation of
prong two. Because circumstances will vary at each school, the Clarification
disavows any reliance on "fixed intervals of time" between program expan-
sions or "particular number[s] of sports."2 73 Nonetheless, OCR ran the
same risk by including specific examples for prong two as it did for-prong
one. Observers who are hungry for concrete guidance may interpret the
examples as broadly applicable standards.274 Some women's sports advo-
cates, for example, have criticized OCR's Institution C example for condon-
ing six-year intervals between the addition of sports.275 Other observers
have criticized the Clarification for permitting "haphazard" program expan-
269 Although prong two refers to program expansion that is responsive to the "devel-
oping" interests of women, the Clarification makes clear that "[d]eveloping interests
include interests that already exist at the institution." OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note
17, at 5-6.
270 Id. at 8.
271 Id.
272 See id. ("[T]he elimination of the team in 1984 took place within the context of
continuing program expansion.").
273 Id. at 6.
274 See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
275 Cary Groth, athletic director at Northern Illinois University and former president
of the National Association of Collegiate Women Athletic Administrators, stated that
"'a six-year gap is too long. There are almost six generations (of women) that have
been cheated out of opportunities."' Mott, supra note 74, at 9. Christine H.B. Grant,
women's athletic director at the University of Iowa, defined "generation" differently,
but expressed similar disappointment in the Institution C example: "That is not fair to
young women. Every four years we turn over a new generation. I'm not one for a spe-
cific number, but I would have a problem with six years." Id.
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sion.276
The examples do raise some interesting questions regarding the fairness
of OCR's emphasis on a continuing practice of program expansion. "Institu-
tion F" is said to be in compliance because its "history since 1987 shows
that it is committed to program expansion."277 A close look at the school's
overall history, however, demonstrates a rather tepid commitment. Institution
F established four women's teams in "the early 1970's" and made no further
improvements until 1987, when it upgraded a club team to varsity status and
"expanded the size of several existing women's teams. ''2" The school's
only other action since 1987 was its implementation, based on a survey of
its current and incoming female students in 1990, of a "plan to add a
women's team by the spring of 1997."279
Remarkably, Institution C's critics failed to criticize Institution F. If the
critics thought six-year intervals were bad, it is surprising that they did not
react to intervals of at least ten years."0 OCR lauds Institution F's ef-
forts "since 1987," but arguably they are not really that exemplary. Admit-
tedly, the school made significant strides in 1987 after an exceptionally long
hiatus, but since 1987 it merely has formulated a plan to add one team sev-
en years after surveys indicated a need for expansion.
Even if OCR's characterization of Institution F's recent activities indi-
cates a strong commitment to program expansion, one might question the
wisdom of focusing almost exclusively on the last decade. OCR's analysis
could lead to interesting results for schools that did "little or nothing until
the late 1980s."' Currently, for example, Institution F has five varsity
sports for women; Brown University, which demoted two women's teams to
club status in 1991, has thirteen. 2 Although Institution F is in compli-
ance, Brown University, which has an "impressive history of program ex-
pansion,"" is not in compliance because it has not recently expanded its
program.
Brown University nevertheless stands in contrast to the University of
276 Lederman, supra note 179, at A52.
277 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 8 (emphasis added).
27 Id. Apparently "several" means four, since that is all the school had prior to 1987.
Id.
279 id.
o One must assume more than a decade passed between the "early" 1970s and
1987, and the school's "plan" to add a team in 1997 may not be on schedule.
281 See Thro & Snow, supra note 56, at 624 n.102 (suggesting that this is one of the
lessons of Cohen v. Brown University).
282 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 195 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992
(U.S. Apr. 21, 1997). The school downgraded volleyball in 1991, but reinstated its
varsity status during the 1994-1995 season. Id. at 192 n.17.
283 Id. at 211.
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Arkansas, which had only six women's teams "[t]hrbughout the 80's and
into the 90's."' Arkansas added three women's sports following a 1993
decision by the Southeastern Conference that its member schools, including
Arkansas, should have two more women's teams than men's teams." This
action, according to the university's chancellor, left Arkansas "in good
shape" with respect to OCR's three-part testy26 If OCR's examples are
adequate indicators, based on the university's recent program enhancements,
the chancellor is correct. One wonders, however, whether Arkansas deserves
more legal protection than Brown, which for two decades provided far more
athletic opportunities to women.
Another irony illustrated by contrasting Arkansas and Brown is that
despite Arkansas's progress in the last few years, it is much further from
substantial proportionality than Brown. When Arkansas's chancellor offered
his opinion regarding his school's Title IX compliance, he fully "realize[d]
that women make up 26 percent of the athletic participants while they com-
prise 53 percent of the enrollment." 7 Apparently, such an enormous dis-
parity is irrelevant because the three prongs of OCR's test stand as indepen-
dent avenues of compliance.
Perhaps the most important question to arise from OCR's analysis of
prong two is whether schools can insulate themselves from Title IX difficul-
ties simply by periodically adding or upgrading a women's team. For exam-
ple, will the schools of the Southeastern Conference be able to avoid liabili-
ty by complying with the conference's 1993 directive? 8 Interestingly, the
district court in Pederson v. Louisiana State University did not find persua-
sive LSU's addition of two teams. In fact, the court sharply rebuffed the
university's argument that its actions constituted a continuing practice of
program expansion:
LSU's decision to add two intercollegiate varsity
women's sports was neither for the purpose of encouraging
women's athletics, nor for responding to an increasing inter-
est and ability in women's athletics on campus. In adding the
two teams, LSU chose merely to follow the decisions made




" Id. Apparently, when Arkansas's three new women's teams are fully operational,
the women's participation rate will increase to 35%. Id. Assuming a continued 53%
female enrollment rate, the resulting 18% disparity still will remain considerably higher
than the 13.01% disparity at Brown. See Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211.
28 See Pieronek, supra note 92, at 369-70 (suggesting that both the Southeastern
Conference's approach and the Big Ten Conference's requirement of 40% female ath-
letic participation by 1997 might satisfy the program expansion prong).
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by the Southeastern Conference concerning whether to add
additional women's teams ....
LSU led a minority move to resist proposed changes
toward gender equity in athletics within the NCAA. Despite
the efforts of the minority group, the NCAA and the South-
eastern Conference recognized the need for expansion of
women's athletics, thus dragging LSU along with the tide of
change."8
The court's language suggests that both an institution's motives for
expansion and its entire history of dealing with women's athletics are at
issue when evaluating the school's commitment to program expansion. That
analysis may be difficult to reconcile with OCR's Clarification examples,
however, because the examples seem to subordinate institutional motives
and early history to recent, tangible results.
OCR's examples seem to suggest that program expansion is a viable
compliance alternative to proportionality. Astute administrators will be eager
to take advantage of that potential opportunity. Arkansas's chancellor, for
example, concluded that his institution's recent program expansion will
probably protect it "for five years," at which point "the institution is poten-
tially back to square one." ' ° If that is correct, twenty-five more years may
not be enough to settle the gender equity debate.
This dilemma again raises a question concerning whether any of the
three prongs should stand alone as a compliance standard.29' Program ex-
pansion, like proportionality, may be a poor substitute for genuine accom-
modation of student interests and abilities. Thus, all three prongs of OCR's
test should be considered in compliance assessment in order to avoid defi-
ciencies inherent in any single prong. 92
In fact, the Clarification recognizes that one really cannot assess pro-
gram expansion in isolation. OCR's commentary on prong two is replete
with language suggesting that prong two is inextricably intertwined with
prong three. The heart of the commentary, for example, states that "the
focus is on whether the program expansion was responsive to developing
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex."293 Moreover, OCR's
principal lessons under prong two apply equally to prong three: existing,
8 Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 916-17 (M.D. La. 1996).
290 Discussions of Title IX, supra note 55, at 5-6.
291 See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 916 (questioning "the wisdom of allowing a uni-
versity to avoid a finding of non-compliance" through satisfaction of only the second
prong).
292 See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
293 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 6.
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viable teams should not be cut because to do so would be antithetical to
accommodating present interests. Rather, schools should respond to student
requests for new or upgraded women's teams294 and conduct periodic sur-
veys to determine whether program expansion is warranted.295 The com-
mentary suggests prong two means little without a simultaneous assessment
under prong three.296
C. Part Three: Full and Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and
Abilities
If an institution does not meet substantial proportionality and cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion, it can still comply with
Title IX if "it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the
members of [the underrepresented] sex have been fully and effectively ac-
commodated by the present program."'297 On its face, this third prong of
OCR's test may appear to be many schools' best hope for compliance.298
To date, however, the courts have been as inhospitable with respect to prong
three as they have been with respect to prong two.
OCR promulgated the three-part test to explain a specific regulation
requiring institutions to "effectively accommodate the interests and abilities"
of its students.299 The third prong of that test now asks whether an institu-
tion has "fully and effectively accommodated" the "interests and abilities" of
its female students.3" This draftsmanship is remarkably incongruous.
OCR's nearly verbatim incorporation of the regulatory language into its
29 "[A]n institution's affirmative responses to requests by students or others for addi-
tion or elevation of sports" is a significant factor to consider. Id. The courts also have
recognized the importance of this consideration. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F.
Supp. 978, 993-94 n.12 (D.R.I. 1992) (distinguishing Brown University from the Uni-
versity of Nebraska at Lincoln and the University of Arkansas in part because at the
latter two schools female students had not requested additional teams), affid, 991 F.2d
888 (1st Cir. 1993).
295 "OCR would also find persuasive an institution's efforts to monitor developing
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex ... by conducting periodic nondis-
criminatory assessments of developing interests and abilities ... ." OCR CLARIFICA-
TION, supra note 17, at 6-7. Two of the Clarification examples, those of Institutions E
and F, refer to institutional surveys of enrolled and incoming students. Id. at 8.
29" The Clarification notes, however, that under prong two, "an institution is not
required, as it is under part three, to accommodate all interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex." Id. at 6 n.3 (emphasis added).
29 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
29 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (suggesting that in
light of difficulty meeting first two prongs, schools will look to satisfy prong three);
Henderson, supra note 140, at 142 (same).
299 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35, 65-67.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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policy interpretation leaves one wondering why prong three is not the test of
compliance, let alone why it has been relegated to third place."0
Nonetheless, in an attempt to give some independent meaning to prong
three, in Cohen v. Brown University,' the court discussed the single lin-
guistic difference between the two standards. The court noted that the policy
interpretation "demands not merely some accommodation, but full and effec-
tive accommodation."3"3 In other words, all female students with the requi-
site interest and ability must be accommodated.3" Obviously, that is a tall
order; it is impossible to accommodate every able student who would be
interested in participating in intercollegiate athletics.3 5 An institution's ob-
ligation ends under prong three, then, at the same point a program expan-
sion obligation ends under prong two: when the school reaches substantial
proportionality.3"
In Cohen, Brown University argued that this analysis rendered prong
three useless because it effectively became nothing more than a proportion-
ality requirement." The court disagreed, contending that other institutions
could use prong three by "point[ing] to the absence of [unaccommodated
female] athletes to justify an athletic program that does not offer substantial
proportionality. '3°" Although that may sound plausible, an institution rarely
will have no "unaccommodated" female students. Moreover, an institution
could not readily make such a showing. The courts have yet to be receptive
to institutional efforts to assess student interests.
3 9
31 In Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914-16 (M.D. La. 1996),
the court questioned the use of either of the first two prongs as an independent compli-
ance standard. "Clearly," the court said, "the pivotal element of the analysis in this case
is the question of effective accommodation of interests and abilities." Id. at 915. In
effect, the court concluded that the only "safe harbor" in the three-part test was prong
three.
302 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
303 Id. at 898 (emphasis added).
" The court acknowledged one limitation on that principle. Noting that "the full-
and-effective-accommodation standard is... not absolute," the court recognized OCR's
qualifications that the level of interest and ability must be sufficient "'to sustain a viable
team' and that there must be "'a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition
for that team."' Id. (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979)).
305 This is especially true if one includes the demand for scholarships.
' The district court in Cohen candidly assessed that its "interpretation of prong
three does require that the unmet interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex be
accommodated to the fullest extent until the substantial proportionality of prong one is
achieved." Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 210 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992
(U.S. Apr. 21, 1997); see also infra text accompanying notes 329-31.
307 See Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 210.
308 Id. (emphasis added).
309 See infra text accompanying notes 335-47.
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The most interesting aspect of Cohen's "full accommodation" theory
may be its apparent departure from the focus of both Title IX and prong one
on equal treatment of the sexes. Is it fair and consistent with Title IX to
accommodate fully women's interests and abilities if men's interests and
abilities are only partially accommodated? Brown University contended in
Cohen that full accommodation of only one sex's interests and abilities ran
counter to Title IX, and remarkably, the First Circuit seemed to agree:
[Brown's objection] overlooks the accommodation test's
general purpose: to determine whether a student has been
"excluded from participation in, [or] denied the benefits of'
an athletic program "on the basis of sex .... ." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1994). While any single element of this tripartite
test, in isolation, might not achieve the goal set by the stat-
ute, the test as a whole is reasonably constructed to imple-
ment the statute.1
If that is true, then it is unclear why each "single element" of the three-part
test is isolated and considered as a separate and independent benchmark for
determining compliance with the accommodation requirement.3" In Cohen,
the court seemed to recognize that consideration of the three-part test "as a
whole" would best advance Title IX's purposes, 312 yet it reinforced the
separation of the three prongs through its safe harbor concept.
Brown University urged the court to adopt a comparative accommoda-
tion standard that would compare the percentage of unaccommodated wom-
en who had the requisite interest and ability to participate in intercollegiate
athletics with the percentage of similarly unaccommodated men.313 Instead,
the First Circuit crafted an example to illustrate the distinction between
comparative accommodation and full accommodation:
Suppose a university (Oooh U.) has a student body consist-
ing of 1,000 men and 1,000 women, a one to one ratio. If
500 men and 250 women are able and interested athletes, the
ratio of interested men to interested women is two to one.
Brown takes the position that both the actual gender compo-
sition of the student body and whether there is unmet interest
among the underrepresented gender are irrelevant; in order to
satisfy the third benchmark, Oooh U. must only provide
310 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899-900 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
311 Id.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 223-24, 303-04 (agreeing with the view that
the three prongs should be evaluated together).
313 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899.
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athletic opportunities in line with the two to one interested
athlete ratio, say, 100 slots for men and 50 slots for women.
Under this view, the interest of 200 women would be un-
met-but there would be no Title IX violation.
We think that Brown's perception of the Title IX uni-
verse is myopic. The fact that the overrepresented gender is
less than fully accommodated will not, in and of itself, ex-
cuse a shortfall in the provision of opportunities for the
underrepresented gender. Rather, the law requires that, in the
absence of continuing program expansion (benchmark two),
schools either meet benchmark one by providing athletic
opportunities in proportion to the gender composition of the
student body (in Oooh U.'s case, a roughly equal number of
slots for men and women, as the student body is equally
divided), or meet benchmark three by fully accommodating
interested athletes among the underrepresented sex (provid-
ing, at Oooh U., 250 slots for women).314
This example demonstrates the futility most schools would encounter in
attempting to comply with prong three as the First Circuit has interpreted it.
As suggested by the court, assume that this relatively small university was
in a position, financially and otherwise, to provide intercollegiate athletic
opportunities to 150 of its students. Further assume that it is currently pro-
viding such opportunities to one hundred men and fifty women, a ratio that
generally reflects participation rates around the country.315 Oooh U. could
comply with prong one by adding fifty more opportunities for women, an
unlikely scenario considering the resource commitment that a thirty-three
percent program expansion would entail. To comply with prong three, how-
ever, Cohen suggests that the university would have to add 200 more oppor-
tunities for women, which would more than double the size of its overall
athletics program.316
The court's example is fundamentally flawed. The three-part test is
structured so that prong three is triggered only when "the members of one
sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes." '317 On its face,
314 Id.
"' See supra text accompanying note 70.
316 The court actually contemplated a much larger program expansion. Recognizing
that men ultimately would become the "underrepresented" sex, the court stated, "Of
course, if Oooh U. takes the benchmark three route, it will also have to provide at least
the same number of slots for men . . . ." Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 n.16. Presumably, the
court means that 150 slots for men would have to be added to reach the 250 slots allot-
ted to women.
31" 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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prong three applies only to the "underrepresented" sex.31 In the Oooh U.
example, once fifty participation opportunities for women are added and
proportionality is achieved, women are no longer underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes. Thus, logically, the road to compliance once again
stops at proportionality.3 9
The Ooh U. example certainly provides ammunition to those who be-
lieve that the full accommodation analysis 'strip[s prong three] of indepen-
dent significance and vitality.""32 Schools like the fictional Oooh U. are
left with one practical avenue of compliance: proportionality. If proportion-
ality is the key, schools operating under budget constraints understandably
will look to the most practical vehicle for traversing that path to compliance:
program cuts. In Cohen, the court recognized this when it invited schools to
consider that alternative:
If a university prefers to take another route, it can also bring
itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the accom-
modation test by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by
reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender while
keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented gender
(or reducing them to a much lesser extent).32'
One reasonably could question whether cutting men's opportunities, or par-
ing both men's and women's opportunities, purely for the sake of symmetry
does anything to "effectively accommodate" student interests and abilities.
One might rationally conclude that such a "perception of the Title IX uni-
verse is myopic. '
Brown University's comparative accommodation theory appears to re-
flect better the regulatory language-"effectively accommodate the interests
and abilities of members of both sexes" 3 -than does Cohen's theory of
full accommodation for one sex. Why then is it wrong? First, said the court,
a comparative assessment is simply inconsistent with the plain language of
OCR's policy interpretation: "Put bluntly, Brown reads the 'full' out of the
duty to accommodate 'fully and effectively.' 324 Moreover, according to
318 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
311 One could argue that this analysis makes prong three an easier, and thus more
meaningful, compliance standard. In fact, in most cases prong three is nothing more
than proportionality masquerading as full and effective accommodation.
320 Connolly & Adelman, supra note 61, at 885. As noted previously, see supra note
61, Connolly served as co-counsel for Brown University in the Cohen litigation.
321 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 n.15.
322 Id. at 899.
3- 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1996) (emphasis added).
" Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899.
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the court, "Brown's view is ... poor policy" because it would complicate
the accommodation assessment.3z
In light of the courts' traditional deference to administrative agencies'
interpretations of the laws that they enforce,32 one can appreciate the
court's first rationale, although it is questionable. 327 The court's policy ra-
tionale, however, is more puzzling. The court went to great lengths to em-
phasize that the comparative approach "would likely make it more difficult
for colleges to ensure that they have complied with Title IX," would "aggra-
vate the quantification problems that are inevitably bound up with Title IX,"
would "invite[] thorny questions as to the appropriate survey population,"
and "would do little more than overcomplicate an already complex equa-
tion.,,3' Even if one believes that methods of analysis should be avoided
simply because they are difficult, the court's rationale. has a more rudimen-
tary defect: the assessment difficulties that the court fears in the comparative
context are identical to those encountered in gauging the interests and abili-
ties of the underrepresented sex.
Consider Cohen's Oooh U. example, which proceeds from the premise
that "500 men and 250 women are able and interested athletes." '329 If a
comparative accommodation theory is the basis for that premise, some as-
sessment tools must be employed to determine the number of both female
and male students who have the interest and ability to participate in intercol-
legiate athletics. Once those numbers have been determined' one easily can
make comparisons between women and men based on student enrollment
figures and on the percentages of both sexes either currently participating in
athletics or "able and interested" but .unaccommodated. Under Cohen's full
accommodation theory; of course, the number of able and interested men is
irrelevant because the theory focuses solely on accommodating the interests
of the underrepresented sex. One still must determine the number of able
and interested women, however, so that their interests can be "fully" accom-
modated.33°
32 Id. at 900.
326 See id. at 895 (noting that deference to agency interpretations is "particularly
high" when Congress has specifically directed an agency to set standards, as with Title
IX). Amusingly, one of Brown University's attorneys suggested that parts of OCR's
policy interpretation are not entitled to deference "because the agency drafted them
having little or no experience, background, or involvement in athletics." Connolly &
Adelman, supra note 61, at 852.
32 The question is whether OCR's three-part test is consistent with the statute and
regulations it purports to interpret. Arguably, the notion of "full" accommodation of one
sex goes well beyond Title IX's mandate and its implementing regulations. If so, it
would be entitled to little deference.
" Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900.
329 Id. at 899.
330 "Full" accommodation really means accommodation until proportionality is
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Under either theory, the only difficulty is measuring student interests
and abilities, and presumably the same assessment tools would be used for
both sexes. Once that task has been completed, comparisons between the
sexes may be made easily. Thus, in Cohen, the court's suggestion that a
comparative analysis would be exceedingly difficult and that the "far more
serviceable" full accommodation approach would require only "a relatively
simple assessment of whether there is unmet need in the underrepresented
gender"33' is disingenuous.
It would be interesting to know how the court envisioned schools mak-
ing the "relatively simple" assessment of "unmet need" among women. The
most evident assessment tool is a survey of students that would ask them
about their athletic interests and experience. The court, however, suggested
that interest surveys are suspect and noted that "thorny questions" surround-
ed even the issue of which survey population to use.332 On remand, the
district court was more direct, contending that any interest assessment would
be "meaningless since it is an impossible task to quantify latent and chang-
ing interests." '333 The court continued:
Given the difficulty of measuring the relative interests of
men and women, it would be almost impossible for an insti-
tution to remain in compliance with Title IX by staying
abreast of the everchanging relative "interests" of its male
and female students and adjusting its program according-
ly .... [C]onstant rebalancing would be necessary to main-
tain compliance, thereby eliminating the ability of an institu-
tion to verify easily that it falls within the "safe harbor" that
prong one provides.334
This language suggests that courts consider prong three to be unmanageable.
Effort should be directed, therefore, toward achieving proportionality.335
Although the courts' fears are understandable, the interest assessment lies at
the heart of prong three. If that standard is to have substance, some means
achieved. See supra text accompanying notes 323-25.
"' Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900.
332 See id.
... Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 205 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S.
Apr. 21, 1997).
"" Id. at 206 n.44.
... See Discussions of Title IX, supra note 55, at 5 (quoting Beverly Ledbetter, Vice
President and Legal Counsel, Brown University, who stated that Brown's attempt to
comply with prong three "was determined by the court to be too complicated, so it
decided to fall back on the proportionality of the student body enrollment as the deter-
mining factor").
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must be available to assess student interests and abilities.
OCR has distanced itself from the Cohen analysis in its recent Clarifica-
tion, which clearly contemplates the use of simple assessment techniques.
Norma Cantu, the head of OCR, has stated that "[t]he policy interpretation
is intended to give institutions flexibility to determine interests and abili-
ties,''336 and that the language of the Clarification is consistent with that
attitude. The Clarification states that institutions have "flexibility" to use
"methods of [their] choosing" in assessing student interests and abilities,
provided those methods are nondiscriminatory.337 More importantly, the
Clarification suggests that OCR is more concerned with an institution's
good faith in the assessment process than it is with precision: "These assess-
ments may use straightforward and inexpensive techniques, such as a stu-
dent questionnaire or an open forum, to identify students' interests and abili-
ties .... OCR does not require elaborate scientific validation of assess-
ments.
The use of student interest surveys has generated controversy on both
sides of the gender equity debate. Several prominent women's sports advo-
cates, for example, have contended that such instruments are inherently
flawed and should not be used to deny opportunities for female athletes
based on a purported "lack of interest. 0 31 In response, the executive direc-
tor of the College Football Association has charged that women's groups are
opposed to surveys because they confirm that women's athletic interests are
being accommodated. 4 Probably there are elements -of truth in both posi-
tions. In 1994, an NCAA research committee developed a survey instrument
for use in a pilot study at four institutions?4' Women's athletic directors
from at least two of those universities have reported that they derived sub-
336 Mott, supra note 74, at 19.
337 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 10.
338 Id. at 10-11. These comments clearly contradict the stance taken by the district
court in Cohen. Remarkably, that court concluded that OCR countenanced the use of
interest surveys only following a finding of noncompliance under prong three,, rather
than as a means of identifying student interests in an effort to comply with prong three.
Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 210 n.51.
339 See Mott, supra note 72, at 28 (noting concerns of Christine H.B. Grant, women's
athletic director at University of Iowa, Charlotte West, associate athletic director at
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, and Valerie M. Bonnette, founder of Good
Sports, Inc. and former OCR senior program analyst); Ronald D. Mott, Title IX Discus-
sion Intensifies on Several Fronts, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 25, 1995, at 6 (noting concerns of
Cary Groth, president of National Association of Collegiate Women Athletic Adminis-
trators and athletic director at Northern Illinois University).
" See Memorandum from Charles M. Neinas, Executive Director, College Football
Association (CFA), to CFA Membership 3 (Apr. 13, 1995) (on file with author).
311 Mott, supra note 72, at 13. The participating institutions were Long Beach State
University, North Dakota State University, Washburn University, and the University of
Wisconsin, La Crosse. Id.
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stantial benefits from the use of the survey. 2 One reported that the survey
"validated what the institution believed all along: It effectively was accom-
modating the athletics interests and abilities of its female athletes.""
Even the latter administrator, however, cautioned that surveys may be
misused and misinterpreted." Many people are eager to advocate the use
of surveys because they are convinced that women simply have a lesser
interest in athletics than do men." One must be wary of making such as-
sumptions, however, because interest and opportunity go hand in hand. As
one commentator pithily stated, "It is hard to have a high level of interest in
playing in a sports program that does not exist.""M6 After decades of a so-
cialization process in which "boys became the heroes of the football field
while the girls stood on the sidelines and cheered," 7 women's athletics in
many ways is still in its infancy. Moreover, even in schools with substantial
women's programs, female athletes often fare poorly in comparison with
their male counterparts in such areas as practice times, facilities, equipment,
coaching staffs and salaries, recruiting budgets, game schedules, publicity,
and transportation." Common sense suggests that interest will be higher
in programs that are better supported and promoted.
The phenomenal growth of women's athletics following the passage of
Title IX indicates that if athletic opportunities are provided, women will
seize them. In the 1970s, athletic participation by female students at Ameri-
342 Id. at 28 (citing Lynn L. Dorn, women's athletic director at North Dakota State
University, where 70% of more than 1100 questionnaires were returned); Bridget
Belgiovine, A Helpful Tool, If Used Correctly, NCAA NEWS, Oct. 16, 1995, at 4.
Belgiovine is director of athletics at the University of Wisconsin, La Crosse, where
62% of 1500 student questionnaires were returned. Id.
141 Mott, supra note 72, at 28 (reporting conclusions of Lynn L. Dorn, women's
athletic director at North Dakota State University).
'" See id.
345 See, e.g., Connolly & Adelman, supra note 61, at 881 (basing this "simple con-
clusion" on participation rates in high school and in club and intramural sports at col-
lege); COLLEGE FOOTBALL Ass'N, supra note 109 ("Academic institutions and research
centers as well as government agencies consistently reveal a higher athletic interest
among male[s] than female[s]."). Cf Editorial, CHI. TRIB., quoted in NCAA NEWS,
May 24, 1995, at 4 ("Anyone who has ever been to a Super Bowl party knows what's
wrong with [a proportionality test]. While many women are interested in sports and
while women participate in increasing numbers, far more men than women make sports
part of their lives.").
346 Farrell, supra note 4, at 1049.
34 Martin, supra note 41, at 481. For a review of some of the myths and stereotypes
that have inhibited women's athletic development over the last several decades, see id.
at 482-84. Athletic participation by women flourished in the late 19th century and early
20th century but declined precipitously in the 1920s and did not begin to reemerge until
the late 1960s. See Farrell, supra note 4, at 1002-04.
' See Lamar, supra note 91, at 260-61.
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can high schools increased from approximately 300,000 to over two million,
while women's intercollegiate participation more than doubled.4 9 "By
1980, however, the rapid rise in participation began to level off, then dimin-
ish a few years later when Title IX protections weakened,, 35" another
strong indication that interest follows opportunity.
Women's interest in athletics undoubtedly will grow, as new generations
of girls grow up watching and attempting to emulate new athletic heroines.
In 1996, for example, play began in professional women's basketball
leagues, and United States women's teams won Olympic gold medals in
basketball, gymnastics, soccer, softball, and synchronized swimming. Soccer
and softball were medal sports for the first time in the Olympics, and many
viewed the Summer Games in Atlanta as a momentous breakthrough for
women's athletics generally.35'
At the intercollegiate level, the numbers alone are telling. In the 1994-
1995 school year, approximately 2.24 million girls participated in high
school athletics, 352 but only about 110,000 women participated in varsity
sports at the NCAA's 903 member institutions.35 3 Although these figures
do not include athletic participants at non-NCAA institutions, they suggest a
pool of over two million "high school girls whose choices have already
indicated an interest in sports but for whom colleges have not provided [an]
opportunity."354
349 NCAA GENDER EQUITY GUIDE, supra note 50, at 2.
351 Id. The most serious blow to Title IX came in 1984 with the Supreme Court's
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Grove City College inter-
preted Title IX to apply only to specific educational programs that received direct feder-
al financial assistance, rather than to institutions as a whole. As a result, if a school's
athletics program itself did not receive direct federal aid, it fell outside Title IX's pur-
view. The law changed dramatically in 1988, however, when Congress legislatively
overruled Grove City College by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1687 (1994). That legislation imposed an institution-wide standard rather than a pro-
gram-specific standard and requires schools to ensure equal opportunities in all of their
programs, regardless of whether the programs directly received federal funds. The Civil
Rights Restoration Act, together with Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503
U.S. 60 (1992), which held that successful plaintiffs in Title IX cases could recover
monetary damages and attorney fees, put strong teeth back into Title IX.
351 See, e.g., Women's Games, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 12, 1996, at 17 (recount-
ing the dramatic achievements of U.S. female athletes and declaring: "Call the Games
of the XXVI Olympiad, from a U.S. perspective, the Gender Equity Olympics."); Mi-
chael Farber, Score One for Women, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 12, 1996, at 70 (opin-
ing that the women's soccer triumph was a victory not only for the 1996 team but also
for the next generation of female athletes).
352 More Students Taking Part in High-School Athletics, supra note 70, at 5 (report-
ing results of survey conducted by National Federation of State High School Associa-
tions).
313 See Sidelines, supra note 70, at A39.
31" Farrell, supra note 4, at 1050. A similar argument could be made for male ath-
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Another indication of interest at the intercollegiate level is the abun-
dance of women's club sports in colleges and universities.35 OCR's Clari-
fication lists participation in club and intramural sports as a significant fac-
tor to consider in assessing student interests and abilities.5 6 The Clarifica-
tion also recognizes that one of the most direct indications of student inter-
est is a request by students either to add a new intercollegiate team or to
upgrade a club sport to varsity status.357 The seriousness with which an in-
stitution responds to such a request may be critical in assessing its compli-
ance efforts.358
Surveys and other assessment tools perhaps are not as useful in evaluat-
ing student ability to participate in intercollegiate athletics, but OCR proper-
ly has downplayed that component of prong three. Some observers smugly
declare that universities are required to accommodate only those "qualified"
women students who possess the "requisite skill" to participate in varsity
athletics.359 Assuming lack of ability, however, is even more problematic
than assuming lack of interest. It is both contradictory and unseemly to extol
the educational benefits of athletic participation and then to argue that wom-
en lack the abilities necessary to receive these benefits.360 Just as interest
follows opportunity, so will ability, provided that an institution supports its
women's program with proper coaching, facilities, equipment, scheduling,
and publicity.36'
In its Clarification, OCR recognized that it may take time before a
fledgling team rises to a specific ability level. It concluded that "the inabili-
ty of interested students... to play at the same level of competition en-
gaged in by the institution's other athletes" does not necessarily demonstrate
a lack of ability.362 The appropriate measure, said the agency, is whether
letes. During the same academic year, more than 3.5 million boys participated in high
school athletics, More Students Taking Part in High-School Athletics, supra note 70, at
5, but fewer than 200,000 varsity slots were available at NCAA schools, Sidelines, su-
pra note 70, at A39.
311 See Wolff, supra note 91, at 59 (noting the "hundreds of women's club teams
around the country just begging for varsity status").
356 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 10.
157 See id.
3.8 See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 993-94 n.12 (D.R.I. 1992) (distin-
guishing Brown University from two other schools, which OCR found in compliance, in
part because students at the other institutions had not requested the addition of new
women's sports), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
... See Connolly & Adelman, supra note 61, at 862.
" See Martin, supra note 41, at 495.
361 Alexander Wolff, a writer for Sports Illustrated, noted colorfully, "[T]he interest
is there, and ability will follow if you're willing to pay enough to hire a coach who
won't have to moonlight as an Amway distributor to make ends meet." Wolff, supra
note 91, at 59.
362 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 11.
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those students "have the potential to sustain an intercollegiate team." '363
Nor should an existing team's past performance be determinative,"' par-
ticularly if there is evidence of a lack of past institutional support for the
team.365
In short, issues regarding student interests and abilities are at the core of
prong three, and to resolve those issues, courts must permit schools to use
"straightforward and inexpensive techniques '366 to determine student
needs. In turn, school administrators must act in good faith and with open
minds. They must conduct their assessments without preconceptions regard-
ing women's interest and ability to compete. Schools should also continue
their efforts to respond regularly to developing student interests.3 67 Al-
though such assessments will not be perfect and may even "complicate"
compliance under Title IX, without them, prong three has little meaning.
Prong three also will be eviscerated if the courts do not retreat from the
full accommodation theory. Both the Sixth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
have followed Cohen's lead.368 Ironically, this theory inevitably compels
schools to comply with proportionality and the most feasible way to achieve
that goal is to cut athletics programs, 369 which unquestionably is the antith-
esis of "full accommodation."
The case law presents another irony as well: The confusion the courts
have generated on prong three was totally unnecessary because these were
363 Id. (emphasis added).
" See id. (discounting "poor competitive record" as indicative of lack of ability).
365 See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. Pa.) ("Although
the field hockey team had a poor won/loss record, this probably stems from a tough
conference, but even more likely is the negative effect of lack of funding, scholarships,
and staff."), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
366 OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 10.
367 See id. at 1i (recommending periodic evaluations of student interest).
368 See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 275 & n.9 (6th
Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 831-32 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). The Second Circuit did not reach the full-versus-
comparative accommodation issue in Cook v. Colgate University, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.
1993), because it found the action moot. Nor did the Third Circuit address the issue in
Favia in light of the case's procedural context. Neither the district court in Cook nor the
district court in Favia mentioned the issue, perhaps because they rendered their deci-
sions prior to Cohen, and the issue had not been presented. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at
585; Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 747-48. In Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 912 F.
Supp. 892, 915-16 (M.D. La. 1996), the court avoided entirely the use of the word
"full" in its application of the three-part test, suggesting that it was not following the
Cohen approach. The court did not consider the comparative accommodation theory,
however, probably because it was unnecessary due to the university's clear failure to
accommodate the interests of the student plaintiffs.
369 See supra text accompanying notes 320-22. Indeed, the easiest way to comply
with proportionality is to eliminate all athletics programs.
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easy cases. Viable, competitive women's teams were being cut or downgrad-
ed in each of the major cases.37 The simplest assessment would have
demonstrated that women's interests and abilities were not being effectively
accommodated. The courts acknowledged that the application of prong three
is considerably "less vexing when plaintiffs seek the reinstatement of an
established team rather than the creation of a new one."37' Thus, answers
to the difficult questions surrounding the interpretation of "full and effective
accommodation" could have waited.
Two final issues arise under prong three. The first concerns the prospect
of intercollegiate competition for newly created women's teams. One pair of
commentators has read Cohen's full accommodation test to mean that
"if... there are students who want to play a sport and who have ability to
play that sport, the institution must offer the sport regardless of the
institution's ability to sustain a team in that sport or the availability of com-
petition." '372 This comment is more than an exaggeration; it seems deliber-
ately misleading. Immediately following Cohen's exposition of its full ac-
commodation standard, the appellate court noted two important limitations:
Although the full-and-effective-accommodation standard
is high, it is not absolute .... [T]he mere fact that there are
some female students interested in a sport does not ipso
facto require the school to provide a varsity team in order to
comply with the third benchmark. Rather, the institution can
satisfy the third benchmark by ensuring participatory oppor-
tunities at the intercollegiate level when, and to the extent
that, there is "sufficient interest and ability among the mem-
bers of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a rea-
sonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for that
")373team ....
OCR's Clarification explicitly reaffirmed those limitations.374 In some re-
spects, requiring a reasonable expectation of competition may inhibit an
370 See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
371 Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832 (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 904 (1st
Cir. 1993)).
372 Thro & Snow, supra note 56, at 624; see also Connolly & Adelman, supra note
61, at 866 (noting that courts require institutions to accommodate "any and all ex-
pressed interest" by female students).
373 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (quoting OCR's policy interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg.
71,418 (1979)) (second emphasis added).
374 See OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 9-12 (noting that in analyzing prong
three, "OCR will consider whether there is (a) unmet interest in a particular sport; (b)
sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of com-
petition for the team.").
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institution's program development because it is contingent on exogenous
circumstances,375 but that seems the only feasible way for prong three to
work. Certainly, the alternative-requiring schools to add varsity teams even
when a competitive schedule could not be secured-appears impractica-
ble.
376
The second, potentially critical issue concerns who bears the burden of
proof on prong three. Must female plaintiffs prove that their institution is
not fully and effectively accommodating their interests and abilities, or will
the institution be required to prove that it is accommodating those interests
and abilities? This issue remains unresolved, despite the court's attempt at
resolution in Cohen.
In each of the three leading gender equity cases-Cohen, Favia, and
Roberts-the district courts placed on the university defendants the burden
to show that they were fully and effectively accommodating the athletic
interests and abilities of their female students.3' In a fourth case, Cook v.
Colgate University,378 which was decided a few months before the other
three cases, the district court did not specifically address OCR's three-part
standard. Moreover, it employed a Title VII burden-shifting analysis that
strays from all of the other gender equity decisions.379 Cook provides no
further guidance because the appellate court in that case vacated the district
court judgment as moot. 8
The burden-of-proof issue did not arise on appeal in Favia because of
its unique procedural context.3"' Thus, the district court's holding that de-
fendants bear the burden on prong three stands. Of the other two cases,
Cohen was the first to be resolved on appeal, and thereby became the lead-
ing case. In Cohen, Brown University urged the First Circuit to adopt the
... See Harris, supra note 91, at 711-12 (referring to schools' "catch-22").
376 OCR apparently recognized the potential dilemma when it included an intriguing
provision to its Clarification, suggesting that an institution "may ... be required to
actively encourage the development of intercollegiate competition for a sport ... when
overall athletic opportunities within its competitive region have been historically limited
for members of [the underrepresented] sex." OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 12.
As one might expect, however, OCR did not elaborate.
" Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D. Colo.) (citing Co-
hen and Favia), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Favia v. Indiana
Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Co-
hen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 992 (D.R.I..1992) (citing the slip opinion in
Favia), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
378 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17(2d Cir. 1993).
379 See id. at 743.
o Cook, 992 F.2d at 20.
3'8 The Third Circuit reviewed a denial of a motion to modify a preliminary injunc-
tion and thus did not reach the merits of the university's Title IX violation. Favia, 7
F.3d at 334, 340, 342 n.18.
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Title VII burden-shifting analysis employed by the district court in Cook.
The First Circuit rejected that idea, concluding that the Title VII approach
was inappropriate in Title IX cases, "excepting perhaps in the employment
discrimination context., 382 The court then overruled the district court's
burden-of-proof analysis and held that student plaintiffs are required to show
a lack of full and effective accommodation by their institutions.383 Three
months later, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Cohen, followed suit in Roberts:
[W]e hold that the district court improperly placed the bur-
den of proof on defendant. Because a Title IX violation may
not be predicated solely on a disparity between the gender
composition of an institution's athletic program and the gen-
der composition of its undergraduate enrollment, see 20
U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994), plaintiff must not only show that
the institution fails on the first benchmark of substantial
proportionality but also that it does not fully and effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of its women ath-
letes. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897. Further, an institution
would be hard-pressed to establish the full and effective
accommodation of the interests and abilities of its women
athletes in the abstract.3s
Interestingly, both the First Circuit in Cohen and the Tenth Circuit in
Roberts purported to base their burden-of-proof allocation on section
1681(b) of Title IX.3 5 That provision, however, states only that institu-
tions shall not be required to grant preferential treatment to women based
solely on participation disparities. The provision does permit the consider-
ation of statistical evidence of such disparities in Title IX proceedings.38
This hardly seems determinative of the burden-of-proof issue.
Conversely, the language of OCR's three-part test suggests that defen-
dants bear the burden on prong three. If neither of the first two prongs is
satisfied, OCR considers "whether it can be demonstrated that the interests
and abilities of [the underrepresented] sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated." 7 Only the defendants have the incentive to "demon-
382 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902 (citing Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897
(1st Cir. 1988), which employed Title VII burden-shifting rules to a Title IX employ-
ment case).
381 Id. at 901-02.
" Roberts v. Colorado State Univ. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
3"5 See id at 831; Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903-04.
6 See supra text accompanying note 205.
387 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979) (emphasis added).
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strate" that the underrepresented sex has been accommodated."' OCR stu-
diously avoided the burden-of-proof issue in its Clarification.3"9
More recent case law also fails to settle the issue. Although the Sixth
Circuit followed Cohen and Roberts in a decision involving high school
athletics,390 the Seventh Circuit suggested that the burden falls on the insti-
tutional defendants.39' In Pederson v. Louisiana State University," the
district court effectively collapsed prong three into a broader "effective ac-
commodation" inquiry393 and therefore did not reach the burden issue.
Thus, the burden-of-proof issue is in doubt. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the allocation of the burden is irrelevant if Cohen's full accommoda-
tion theory applies. It would be futile for defendants to try to show that they
have "fully" accommodated all female students with an interest and an abili-
ty to participate in athletics.394 Alternatively, if the burden shifts to the
plaintiffs, Cohen suggests that it is "a relatively simple" showing that "there
is unmet need" in the female student population.395 Indeed, in both Cohen
and Roberts, the appellate courts found the district courts' misallocation of
the burden to be "harmless error" because the record easily demonstrated
38 If OCR intended plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof on this issue, inclusion of
the word "not," as in "interests and abilities ... have not been ... accommodated,"
would have been logical.
389 The Clarification tracks the language of the three-part test, declaring that the key
to compliance under prong three is whether "it can be demonstrated that ... the inter-
ests and abilities of [the underrepresented sex] are, in fact, being fully and effectively
accommodated." OCR CLARIFICATION, supra note 17, at 9 (emphasis added). Again,
this language suggests that defendants bear the burden of proof.
7 Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Cohen and Roberts).
'9' See Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Even if sub-
stantial proportionality has not been achieved, a school may establish that it is in com-
pliance by demonstrating either that it has a continuing practice of increasing the athlet-
ic opportunities of the underrepresented sex or that its existing programs effectively ac-
commodate the interests of that sex."). The Department of Justice apparently concurs, as
the language in its amicus curiae brief in the Cohen litigation indicates. See Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st
Cir. 1996) ("The district court correctly ruled that Brown failed to show that women
were fully and effectively accommodated . . . .") (emphasis added).
2 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
3' See id at 914-17.
Moreover, proportionality invariably would be reached prior to full accommoda-
tion, see supra text accompanying notes 329-31, so prong three and the burden-of-proof
issue would become moot.
" See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 900. (1st Cir. 1993); Thro & Snow,
supra note 56, at 626 n.113 (criticizing "the relaxed standard applied in Brown" and
suggesting that plaintiffs' burden would be "far more difficult if [they] were required to
prove interest, ability, sustainability, and a reasonable expectation of competition as the
regulations and policy interpretation clearly contemplated").
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that the universities had not fully accommodated their female students. 96
At first glance, then, Cohen apparently threw a bone to universities in its
burden-of-proof analysis, but the bone was flavorless.
Cohen's full accommodation theory renders prong three virtually useless.
If applied as the court contemplated, it leads directly to proportionality.
Ironically, prong three ought to be the principal test of compliance because
its language is nearly identical to the regulation purportedly served by the
policy interpretation. Instead, proportionality is favored, although it often
encourages a result opposite to effective accommodation of student interests
and abilities.
The easiest method by which most institutions can progress toward pro-
portionality is to cut athletics programs, particularly nonrevenue men's
sports. That manifestation of institutional homage to proportionality is the
focus of the next section of this Article.
III. THE ELIMINATION OF MEN'S NONREVENUE SPORTS
OCR's and the courts' emphasis on proportionality as the principal
means of Title IX compliance has left men's sports vulnerable.3" School
officials' understandable response to gender equity pressures is reflected in
the following comment:
The big issue today is the lack of funding. If there is a
certain pie that the university has to run its athletic program,
the only question at this point is how do you divvy up that
pie to bring about gender equity? If you cannot expand pro-
grams for the underrepresented gender because of the lack of
funding, you are going to have to make cuts on the
overrepresented gender's program .... "
3 See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 831-32 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
31 See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994) (concern-
ing the elimination of men's swimming at University of Illinois although women's
swimming was retained due to Title IX concerns); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp.
1000, 1002-03 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (concerning the elimination of Drake's wrestling pro-
gram and finding that the extent to which gender equity influenced decision is "a matter
of dispute"); Denise K. Stellmach, Note, Title IX: The Mandate for Equality in Colle-
giate Athletics, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 203, 212 (1994) (noting that women's soccer at
University of Michigan was upgraded to varsity status with funds secured from the
elimination of men's gymnastics).
... Ross, supra note 8, at 141 (quoting Fred Heinrich, attorney for University of Illi-
nois, which defended a reverse discrimination suit initiated subsequent to elimination of
men's swim team).
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Athletic administrators looking for areas in which to make program cuts
inevitably focus on nonrevenue sports, such as gymnastics, swimming, and
wrestling, which typically do not generate revenue for the athletic depart-
ment. Over the last two decades, some nonrevenue sports have experienced
dramatic declines. For example, in the academic year 1974-1975, 401 of the
704 NCAA institutions sponsored wrestling programs, but in 1994-1995, de-
spite an increase to 909 NCAA member schools, only 261 wrestling pro-
grams remained.399 Men's gymnastics programs dwindled from 133 to thir-
ty-two during that same period,"e and extinction is a possibility."'
To publicize their plight, representatives of men's nonrevenue sports
conducted a vigorous lobbying campaign in Congress in 1994 and 1995.402
Some representatives sought a statement from Congress or OCR that elimi-
nating men's teams was an unacceptable means of complying with Title IX,
while others went further, arguing for a "protected status" clause prohibiting
schools from eliminating certain sports.4"3 Those lobbying efforts led to a
congressional hearing on Title IX in May 1995 and ultimately to OCR's
January 1996 Clarification of its three-part compliance standard.4"
When OCR released its Clarification, Norma V. Cantu, the head of
OCR, stated that "cutting or capping men's teams will not help an institu-
tion comply with part two or part three of the test because these tests mea-
sure an institution's positive, ongoing response to the interests and abilities
9 Zapler, supra note 9, at A44.
400 Id.
401 NCAA rules generally allow national championships only for sports in which at
least 40 institutions compete, NCAA Manual, supra note 85, art. 18.2.3, at 396, and it
is likely that the number of gymnastics programs would decline even more precipitously
without a national championship. The NCAA membership granted the sport a two-year
reprieve in 1995 by approving a moratorium on the discontinuation of national champi-
onships through the 1996-1997 academic year. Legislation, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 25,
1995, at 1-5. On January 14, 1997, the NCAA agreed to protect indefinitely national
championships in all Olympic sports. Olympic-Sport Championships Preserved, NCAA
NEWS, Jan. 27, 1997, at 1. Thus, gymnastics championships will continue until the
NCAA membership takes specific action to discontinue them. Id. at 24. For the time
being, then, the sport will survive, but its future seems very uncertain.
402 One of the leaders of the lobbying effort was T.J. Kerr, wrestling coach at Cali-
fornia State University at Bakersfield and president of the National Wrestling Coaches
Association, who wrote to each member of Congress, "Soon there will be little oppor-
tunity for males to compete in athletics other than football and basketball." Zapler,
supra note 9, at A43.
403 See id.; Mott, supra note 184, at 8-9 (reporting on "protected status" argument
made by Roy Johnson, men's gymnastics coach at University of Massachusetts at
Amherst and president of the National Association of Collegiate Gymnastics Coaches
(Men)).
41 See supra text accompanying notes 9-17.
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of the underrepresented sex."4 5 As long as proportionality stands as an in-
dependent means of compliance under prong one, however, cutting men's
teams will remain an attractive option for administrators operating under
tight budgets.
To date, nonrevenue sports have taken the brunt of the cuts, and institu-
tions have adopted a "hands off" approach toward football and men's bas-
ketball, which traditionally generate more revenue for athletic depart-
ments.4" Nonetheless, college football representatives fervently have
joined the battle against proportionality, undoubtedly because they see foot-
ball as a likely target for future budget cuts. Charles M. Neinas, executive
director of the College Football Association, stated that "the prevailing opin-
ion among the women's advocacy groups" is that men who lose athletic
opportunities due to program cuts deserve "no sympathy."4" Women's
sports advocates have denied the charge and have accused Neinas and others
of "engaging in scare tactics" by claiming that Title IX compliance requires
the elimination of men's teams.4" Indeed, gender equity proponents have
argued that the elimination of men's sports actually impedes women's prog-
ress because it results in a backlash against women."
The real message from women's sports advocates is reasonable: if a lack
of financial resources truly underlies an institution's difficulty in meeting
gender equity goals, that school may have to reduce expenditures in its
men's athletics program to generate money for women's sports' expansion.
That does not mean, however, that teams must be eliminated. Schools
should examine their entire athletics program for potential cost-savings be-
fore eliminating teams.41 If schools conduct an honest appraisal of their
programs, one of the most obvious candidates for cutbacks is football: al-
though it is the largest revenue-producer, it is also the largest "consum-
er."4 1'
'o" Mott, supra note 184, at 19 (quoting the letter accompanying final Clarification).
406 Blum, supra note 5, at A34; see also Farrell, supra note 4, at 995 ("Despite feder-
al mandate, Title IX has had surprisingly little effect on college football.").
"' Memorandum from Charles M. Neinas, Executive Director of College Football
Association (CFA) to CFA Board of Directors (Mar. 9, 1995) (on file with author).
40 p. David Pickle, Ruling Not Surprising, Most Administrators Agree, NCAA
NEWS, Apr. 5, 1995, at 1, 14 (quoting Wendy Hillard, president of Women's Sports
Foundation).
' Ross, supra note 8, at 142 (reporting comments of Karol Kahrs, associate athletic
director at University of Illinois); see also Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX
Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the "Equal Oppor-
tunity" Standard, 1994 DET. C.L. REv. 953, 997 (noting that eliminating men's teams
"alienat[es] and polariz[es] the men against the women").
410 See Heckman, supra note 409, at 997 & n.251 (observing that the Department of
Justice's amicus curiae brief in Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir.
1994), recognized that "spreading the cuts across [the] men's athletic program" may be
preferable to "abruptly terminating teams").
411 Lamar, supra note 91, at 274; see also Wolff, supra note 91, at 61 ("[O]perating
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The mere mention of cutbacks in football, however, elicits indignation
from the sport's more strident backers,412 who contend that cutbacks will
lower the quality of the game, perhaps to the point of destruction.413 Such
arguments ring hollow, however, to observers who see frivolous expendi-
tures as the norm in many football programs. Schools wishing to save mon-
ey can begin with the frills and excesses that have negligible effects on the
quality of performance. 4
Fat-trimming, however, has met resistance. Simply eliminating a home
game hotel, for example, could save thousands of dollars and probably fund
a new women's team,41 5 but in 1994, university presidents abandoned
sound fiscal judgment and rejected an NCAA finance committee recommen-
dation to prohibit such expenditures.416
expenses ... at a typical football school are more than those of all other men's and
women's sports combined.").
412 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 3, at A35 (reporting on the 1993 College Football
Association convention and quoting Ken Hatfield, Clemson University's football coach,
as saying that "[e]verybody is taking pot shots at football" and quoting Rev. Edmund P.
Joyce, former executive vice-president at University of Notre Dame, as referring to
"militant women" who have engaged in an "irrational attack of football as their
bugaboo"); Mike Jensen, Male Coaches Blame Women for More Cuts, NORMAN TRAN-
SCRIPT, May 9, 1995, at 11 (quoting Bob Frederick, athletic director at the University of
Kansas, who said that "the new 'F' word is 'football"'); Memorandum from Charles M.
Neinas, Executive Director, College Football Association, to CFA Membership, supra
note 340, at 2 ("Women's advocacy groups have cast football as the villain .... ").
413 See Henderson, supra note 140, at 151 (noting the argument that cutbacks will
"destroy the product"); Richard E. Lapchick, Introduction: Gender Equity in Sports, 2
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 1, 2 (1995) (noting the argument that Title IX will "ruin
college football"); Elizabeth Lee, Does a Real Solution Exist?, U. MAGAZINE, Oct.
1993, at 11, 15 (quoting Bo Schembechler, former football coach at the University of
Michigan: "You can't continually chip away at football .... There becomes a concern
of being able to maintain the same level of performance you had before.").
414 Henderson, supra note 140, at 153 (footnote omitted) (noting that football pro-
grams enjoy "plush locker rooms[;] expensively furnished conference rooms and coach-
es offices; ... overnight hotel accommodations and prime time cinema movies on the
eve of a home game; team travel over short distances by airplane; and exorbitant re-
cruiting budgets.")
415 See id. at 153 n.120 (estimating the cost of a home game hotel at $4000 to $7000
per night); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ.,'809 F. Supp. 978, 1000 (D.R.I. 1992) (not-
ing that ending university funding of women's gymnastics and volleyball saved Brown
approximately $62,000 per year), aft'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Kelli Anderson,
The Unkindest Cut, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 28, 1992, at 58 (noting that the yearly
cost of operating the women's tennis team cut at the University of Massachusetts was
$14,000).
416 Douglas Lederman, NCAA Presidents Won't Push for Limit on Football Teams,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 7, 1993, at A45. The presidents also rejected measures to
cap the size of football teams at 105 and to reduce the number of on-campus recruiting
visits by 20%. Id.
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Admittedly, "trimm[ing] around the edges" '417 may not be sufficient for
some schools to make meaningful progress toward Title IX compliance.
These schools, therefore, should reexamine seriously the number of their
football scholarships and the size of their coaching staffs. Apologists for
big-time football contend that eighty-five scholarships is "far short of the
need,"1  but they have a difficult time explaining why college teams need
many more players than professional football teams, which operate success-
fully with rosters of forty-seven.419 "[F]ootball is buying bench warm-
ers, ' 420 and it is difficult to justify scholarships for nonplayers when op-
portunities for exceptional female athletes are severely limited.42'
Modest reductions in scholarships and coaching staffs not only would
yield significant savings that could be reallocated to the development of
women's sports but also would permit schools to remain competitive.422 In
fact, across-the-board reductions in scholarships would increase competitive
parity among schools. Traditional football powerhouses would have fewer
opportunities "to stockpile recruits,, 423 and after talented recruits enrolled
as scholarship athletes at schools with less prominent football programs,
competitive gaps would narrow.424
Another common theme among football advocates is that cutbacks in
football would endanger all other sports because they are financially depen-
dent on the revenues football brings into the athletic department.425 That
417 Ross, supra note 8, at 143 (quoting Fred Heinrich, attorney for University of Illi-
nois).
418 Mott, supra note 339, at 6 (quoting Grant Teaff, executive director of the Ameri-
can Football Coaches Association); see also Connolly & Adelman, supra note 61, at
912 (stating that "football teams require at least eighty-five members").
419 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 140, at 159-60; Wolff, supra note 91, at 61.
41 Wolff, supra note 91, at 63.
421 As one commentator noted, "You can't tell me it's more valuable educationally to
have a fifth tier on the football depth chart than to have a women's softball team." Id.
at 61.
422 Other commentators have offered specific downsizing proposals that may serve as
useful models. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 140, at 159-60 (recommending a cap of
85 on squad size and a reduction of scholarships from 85 to 72); Wolff, supra note 91,
at 61 (noting that the elimination of 15 scholarships and two assistant coaches would
generate about $300,000 for women's program expansion).
41 Wolff, supra note 91, at 61.
4' Recent history suggests that scholarship reductions already have had such an ef-
fect. During the last 20 years, the NCAA has reduced the maximum number of football
scholarships at Division I-A schools from 120 to 85. Lee, supra note 413, at 15. Top-
ten rankings at the end of the 1995-1996 season for former also-rans such as North-
western University and Kansas State University provide persuasive evidence of in-
creased parity. See id.
41 See, e.g., Susan Hiller, Football Fiscally Everybody's Friend, SIDELINES, Sept.
1995, at 6 ("College football may be the target of some women's advocacy groups, but
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argument is meritorious, of course, only if football programs spend less than
they bring in and then divert excess revenues to other athletics teams. Stud-
ies consistently have shown that relatively few college football programs
actually make money, at least at smaller schools.4" NCAA Division I-A
schools fare much better, with over half reporting a profit. 427 At these
schools, substantial revenues would be available to help fund other sports,
although statistics suggest that only a small percentage of football profits
actually go to women's athletics programs."
Even if football did help to finance the rest of the athletics program, it is
a stretch to conclude that cutbacks in football would result in significant
revenue losses. A moderate reduction in football's "standard of living,"
429
such as the elimination of home game hotel stays, reductions in the number
of assistant coaches, less expensive modes of team travel, or fewer ameni-
ties in the coach's office, locker room, or athletic dormitory, would not pose
a serious threat to revenues. Defenders of the status quo believe that cut-
backs will damage the "quality of-the game," but it is unlikely that even
substantial cutbacks, such as reducing the number of football scholarships
by fifteen or twenty percent, would affect significantly the quality of play.
These measures probably would not affect revenues by deterring fans from
attending games43 or by deterring donors from contributing to their alma
maters. Indeed, if the NCAA mandated scholarship cuts at all schools, parity
among schools probably would increase, which in turn might "generate
more fan interest and, ultimately, more money.'
431
without its financial contribution, every other sport except men's basketball would
flounder in economic instability.") (Hiller is the editor of Sidelines, which is published
by the College Football Association.); Christopher Raymond, Comment, Title IX Litiga-
tion in the 1990's: The Courts Need a Game Plan, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 665, 665
n.2 (1995) (quoting Bobby Bowden, football coach at Florida State University: "[The]
only thing gender equity needs to be very careful of--don't destroy the goose that lays
the golden egg.").
426 See Farrell, supra note'4, at 1029-30 (noting that only 75 of 492 schools (15%)
responding to a 1993 NCAA survey reported profit from their football programs, in-
cluding 4.5% of responding schools in the NCAA's three smallest divisions and 67% of
responding Division I-A schools); Martin, supra note 41, at 493 (reporting in 1981 that
"about eighty percent of collegiate football programs lose money"); Wolff, supra note
91, at 55 (noting that 13% of NCAA football programs made a profit in 1989).
427 Farrell, supra note 4, at 1030. (noting that 57 of 106 Division I-A schools reported
profit, 28 reported loss, .and 21 did not respond).
41 See id. at 1030-32.
429 Cohen v. Brown University, 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D.R.I. 1995) (quoting Donna
Lopiano, executive director of Women's Sports Foundation), affid in part, rev'd in part,
101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997,WL 81992 (U.S. Apr. 21,
1997).
430 See Wolff, supra note 91, at 61.
431 Id.
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Reductions in football scholarships or team sizes should not be under-
taken simply to achieve proportionality. Proportionality is often a poor sub-
stitute for effective accommodation of student interests and abilities. Cut-
backs in football expenditures, however, represent a viable means of procur-
ing funds to expand women's athletic opportunities. If football's advocates
support gender equity as they have insisted that they do,432 they should be
prepared to accept cuts in their own programs, not just in men's nonrevenue
sports.433 Until schools are willing to reexamine their priorities, women's
sports advocates will be justified in concluding that much of the gender
equity debate concerns "sacred cows.'4
Indeed, men's sports advocates should be equally concerned about the
prevailing institutional attitude that "revenue" sports are untouchable. Over-
looked in gender equity discussions is the fact that nonrevenue sports are
those most likely to be eliminated by administrators who feel pressure to
move toward proportionality. These sports provide the vast majority of male
students with their only opportunity to compete in intercollegiate athlet-
ics.435 Increasingly, football and basketball are sports in which only excep-
tionally large or tall men can expect to compete. Most of the other men's
sports can accommodate good athletes of more normal stature.436
432 See, e.g., Billy Joe, Title IX Application Needs Further Review, NCAA NEWS,
May 24, 1995, at 4 (Joe, then-president of the American Football Coaches Association
(AFCA), asserting that the AFCA "supports full and fair access to intercollegiate sports
for women and is committed to the principles that prompted Title IX"); Pickle, supra
note 408, at 14 (quoting Grant Teaff, AFCA executive director: "Remember that our
association totally supports the principles of Title IX. There is no question about that.").
4' The reaction of Ray Goff, former football coach at the University of Georgia, is
typical: "Gender equity is a two-edged sword. You don't want to eliminate opportunities
for anybody, but on the other hand, if you add sports [for women] you're going to have
to cut men's non-revenue teams." Lee, supra note 413, at 11, 14. Apparently, it did not
occur to Goff that football might be able to share the pain with other men's sports. It is
that kind of attitude that led one insider, a "respected Division I-A official" who re-
quested anonymity, to conclude that the football powers "are 50 years late in their
thinking. They're damned lucky the hammer hasn't fallen before now ... ." Douglas
Lederman, Angry Football Powers Talk of Leaving NCAA Over Its Sex-Equity Propos-
al, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 30, 1993, at A29.
434 Zapler, supra note 9, at A44 (quoting Donna Lopiano, executive director of
Women's Sports Foundation). Another commentator has referred to football as "a bloat-
ed bovine treated like a sacred cow." Wolff, supra note 91, at 61.
431 College football teams often start offensive lines that average about 300 pounds
per man. In professional basketball, the Charlotte Hornets recently acquired seven-foot,
one-inch Vlade Divac, enabling coach Dave Cowens to shift several of Divac's new
teammates "back to ... their natural positions": seven-foot Matt Geiger to power for-
ward; six-foot, seven-inch, 250-pound Larry Johnson to small forward; and six-foot,
eight-inch Glen Rice to guard. Change of Heart Clears Way for Bigtime Trade, NOR-
MAN TRANSCRIPT, July 2, 1996, at 11.
436 Even baseball, however, apparently has evolved into a big man's sport. See
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If nonrevenue sports are to survive, their representatives must reevaluate
any alliances they may have with football, remind those in positions of
influence that the regulatory goal of Title IX is effective accommodation of
"both sexes,"437 and sell their programs to their own athletic departments.
Nonrevenue men's sports are unlikely to receive significant judicial assis-
tance. The courts have been unsympathetic to reverse discrimination claims
brought by male athletes whose teams were eliminated.
Federal courts have considered two reverse discrimination suits.438 The
first, Gonyo v. Drake University,439 involved wrestling, a sport that is par-
ticularly vulnerable to cuts because it has no women's counterpart, and
therefore schools can eliminate the sport without the need to justify retaining
a parallel women's program.440 The plaintiffs in Gonyo were varsity wres-
tlers who brought Title IX and equal protection claims against their universi-
ty after it eliminated its intercollegiate wrestling program."' In ruling on a
preliminary injunction motion, the court recognized that one of "[t]he spe-
cial values of wrestling" was that "it is open to all sizes and shapes of peo-
ple-many of whom, because of their small stature, would be unable to
compete safely and effectively in most other sports."44 Nonetheless, the
court found little merit to the plaintiffs' legal claims and later granted sum-
mary judgment to the university." 3
George F. Will, The Pitch ... It's Outahere, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1996, at 96 (attrib-
uting the increase in home runs and scoring in major league baseball in part to bigger
batters who "are increasingly built like linebackers").
437 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1996) (emphasis added).
438 A third suit, brought by a member of the men's swimming team which the Uni-
versity of Arkansas had targeted for elimination, was dropped after the university
agreed to consider continuing a limited swimming program until all current swimmers
graduated. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 16, 1993, at A35.
439 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (denying plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction); 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (granting defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment).
440 Anderson, supra note 3, at 4 ("[T]he problem was, and is, OCR and [OCR head]
Norma Cantu .... Fortunately, Ms. Cantu and the OCR soon will be only a bad memo-
ry for all of us. Americans and now (finally) Congress and college administrators are
tired of these bureaucracies, bureaucrats and all of their stupid bureaucratic rules.");
Blum, supra note 5, at A34 (reporting comments of Lawrence Marcucci, the plaintiffs'
attorney in Gonyo); Kocher, supra note 4, at 4-5 (referring to OCR's "incompetence
and abusiveness," the actions of "gender quota extremists" and "social engineering from
government bureaucrats").
"a' Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1001. The plaintiffs also asserted breach of contract and
fraudulent misrepresentation claims, but those state claims were dismissed after the
court granted summary judgment on the federal claims. See id. at 1001, 1007.
442 Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 991.
143 The court easily disposed of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim on the ground
that Drake University, a private institution, was not acting under color of state law.
Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1006. Its analysis of the Title IX claim, however, is rather odd.
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Male swimmers fared no better in Kelley v. Board of Trustees,"4 in
which the Seventh Circuit also upheld summary judgment for the defen-
dants. In Kelley, the University of Illinois eliminated four varsity sports,
including men's swimming, but retained women's swimming due to con-
cerns about Title IX. 5 Thus, the principal thrust of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint was that the disparate treatment of men's and women's swimming
constituted unlawful sex discrimination under both Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.446
The Seventh Circuit disposed of the Title IX claim with little analysis.
The court simply spelled out OCR's three-part test and concluded both that
the test "maps out a reasonable approach to measuring compliance with
Title IX"" 7 and that the university's actions "were consistent" with the
test.448 The court's analysis of the equal protection claim, although similar-
ly brief, is more intriguing.
The plaintiffs argued that the elimination of men's swimming was not
"substantially related" to the goals of Title IX because even though it would
improve the university's proportionality statistics, it would not increase
athletic opportunities for women." 9 The court rejected that argument, rea-
soning that "Title IX's stated objective is not to ensure that the athletic
opportunities available to women increase. Rather its avowed purpose is to
prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of
sex. 5
450
The court's rationale represents a distillation of the dilemma not only
posed by the elimination of men's sports but more broadly by the very ap-
plication of OCR's three-part test, with its emphasis on proportionality. If
Title IX's purpose is simply to equalize opportunities for men and women
by providing symmetry in participation slots, proportionality would serve
that goal admirably, and the elimination of men's sports would be an effi-
The court adopted the proportionality test as the governing standard and concluded that
the university fell within Cohen's "safe harbor" because men were substantially
overrepresented among intercollegiate athletes. See id. at 1004-06. The safe harbor ap-
proach, however, applies only when an institution has reached substantial proportionali-
ty. Drake clearly had not reached that status, and the court probably erred in embracing
the safe harbor concept in a reverse discrimination context. The plaintiffs' focus on the
university's disparate allocation of scholarships further complicates the opinion. See id.
at 1003-05.
"- 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
"5 Id. at 269.
446 See id. at 267, 269-72.
447 Id. at 271.
448 Id. at 272. Once again, the court's adoption of the three-part test, and particularly
Cohen's "safe harbor" approach, see id. at 271, seems questionable in this reverse dis-
crimination context. See supra note 443.
449 Kelly, 35 F.3d at 272.
I' d. (emphasis added).
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cient, cost-effective means of compliance. If, however, Title IX really con-
cerns increasing and enhancing women's athletic opportunities, elimination
of men's sports, without further action, does not bear a substantial relation
to that goal.
Valerie M. Bonnette, formerly a senior program analyst for OCR and
currently president of Good Sports, Inc., a Title IX consulting firm, has
noted, "The law really doesn't care if you're offering a tremendous athletics
program for men and women or an awful one, so long as you're offering
equitably awful or successful programs for men and women."45' She may
be correct; Kelley, for example, suggests that strict equality may comport
with the letter of the law.452 "Equitably awful" programs, however, surely
would be inconsistent with the spirit of Title IX.
Several prominent women's sports advocates, as well as the author of
this Article, have found Bonnette's attitude shortsighted.453 Avoiding com-
pliance through elimination of men's programs would help to preserve ex-
ceptional traditions in men's sports, and, more importantly, equitably suc-
cessful programs would solidify women's rightful place in the athletic
world.454
Institutions and states with the requisite commitment can accommodate
women's athletic interests and abilities without endangering men's sports.
The University of Texas, for example, settled a gender equity suit by agree-
431 Ronald D. Mott, Sweet: Focus Should Be on All Parts of Title IX, NCAA NEWS,
Apr. 22, 1996, at 1, 24.
412 Kelly, 35 F.3d at 272; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp 978, 993, 999
(D.R.I. 1992) (suggesting the complete elimination of athletics programs as a viable
Title IX conformance option for universities), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
413 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D.R.I. 1995) (quoting
Donna Lopiano, executive director of Women's Sports Foundation, who noted that "the
whole idea [of Title IX] is to add participation opportunities for women. And it's unfor-
tunate that across the country ... men's sports are being cut and women's gender equi-
ty under Title IX [is] being blamed for that."), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155
(1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-1321, 1997 WL 81992 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1997);
Heckman, supra note 25, at 25-26 ("[Elimination of men's teams] is somewhat draconi-
an: Although it renders the opportunity equal for both sexes, the underlying goal of
Title IX is to foster female participation, not to deny athletic opportunity altogether.");
Title IX and Athletics, supra note 254, at 436 (quoting Arthur H. Bryant, executive
director of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, who asserted that "Title IX's goal ... is to
ensure equality ... [but w]hat we all would prefer is enhanced opportunities for both
genders-not to cut men's teams but to increase women's opportunities by adding
women's teams").
"5 Wrestling, for example, has been judicially noticed as "the most ancient of all
sports," contested in "the Olympian games in ancient Greece" and literally a sport of
kings, as evidenced by the wrestling match between King Henry VIII of England and
King Francis I of France. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 991 (S.D. Iowa
1993).
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ing to add two women's teams, increase the number of female "walk-ons"
(nonscholarship athletes), and more than double women's participation op-
portunities.45 University officials estimated the cost of this program devel-
opment at more than one million dollars, but they committed not to weaken
or eliminate any existing men's teams. Instead, the necessary additional
funds would come from a joint fundraising campaign by the men's and
women's athletics programs, budget-trimming throughout the athletic depart-
ment, and possible student fee increases.456 The University of Iowa an-
nounced a plan in 1992 to reach proportionality within five years through
several steps, including the addition of two women's sports, an increase in
women's scholarships, a ten percent reduction in men's scholarships, and a
cap-on squad sizes for men's sports.457 Men's teams undoubtedly will have
to make adjustments to accommodate the latter two steps, but no teams will
be eliminated and team competitiveness should. not be affected by these
modest cuts.
One interesting aspect of the Iowa plan is the institution's proposal to
seek out-of-state tuition waivers for student athletes.458 A similar tuition
waiver program has existed in the state of Washington for several years,
which allows that state's universities to make dramatic progress toward
gender equity.45 9 Florida passed legislation that requires its state-supported
institutions to devise gender equity plans by 1997, subject to a loss of state
funds for failure to comply.4 ° Schools in Florida have raised student fees
and expanded efforts to market and promote women's sports to generate
additional revenues.461
These examples indicate that creative thinking and a fresh attitude can
help institutions boost women's athletics without resorting to the elimination
of men's sports. 62 In the long run, cooperative efforts by men and women
45 Blum, supra note 139, at A40.
456 Id.
457 Lamar, supra note 91, at 267-68. Another plank of the Iowa plan is to "[plush for
national legislation to eliminate expensive and non-essential practices, and use the sav-
ings for equity." Id. at 267.
451 See id. at 267.
411 See id. at 271-72; Kelly Whiteside, A State of Enlightenment, SPORTS ILLUSTRAT-
ED, Sep. 28, 1992, at 56 (noting that state tuition-waiver legislation freed up over $1
million in the academic year 1991-1992 for the development of women's athletics pro-
grams at Washington's two largest state universities).
" Crawford & Strope, supra note 46, at 565-66.
461 Id.
462 Even seemingly small changes can increase revenues and send the message that
"women's teams are valued." Id. at 565. Northern Kentucky University, for example,
elevated the visibility of its women's basketball. program by scheduling half of its
games in prime time, following the men's game. Id. Schools also can support their
women's athletics programs by "capitaliz[ing] on the marketing appeal of direct fan
involvement." Harris, supra note 91, at 716. Due to their smaller size, most women's
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to enhance opportunities for both sexes will better serve institutions' educa-
tional goals.
CONCLUSION
As female athletes have turned to litigation in an effort to enforce Title
IX, the battles over gender equity have intensified. Debates on the issue
increasingly have become heated, and polarization on the issue is at an all-
time high. Women's sports advocates draw strength from early judicial
decisions, while male athletes fear losing their sports, and school officials
wonder how their institutions can ever comply with a strict proportionality
standard.463
In deciding Title IX cases, courts generally have deferred to OCR's
longstanding three-part test, leading a newly recharged OCR to proclaim
solidarity with the judiciary.4" The law, however, is unsettled. First, the
leading cases-Cohen, Roberts, and Favia-are exceedingly poor tests of
Title IX's requirements. All three cases involved institutions that were sued
for eliminating or demoting existing, vital women's teams. Considering this
context, it would have been astonishing if any of the courts concluded that
the defendants had "effectively accommodated" the athletic interests and
abilities of their female students. Indeed, much of the courts' opinions could
be characterized as dicta. Second, Pederson, which was decided in 1996,
questions both the three-part standard itself and other courts' application of
that standard.
OCR's three-part test could be the basis of a meaningful standard, but as
written, it can lead to perverse results. As applied by OCR and the courts,
proportionality under prong one reigns, while prongs two and three have
been relegated to supporting roles. The court in Cohen, for example, stated
that prong two or prong three could, under the right circumstances, serve as
a "proxy" for prong one.4 65 This analysis, however, is difficult to defend.
programs can readily offer fans such attractions as choice seats, participation in guest
coaching programs, and travel excursions with the team. Id. Such actions would build
both fan loyalty and financial support.
463 One study suggests that the only schools that currently could meet a five percent
disparity standard-a five percent differential between women's athletic participation
rate and their enrollment rate-either had no football program or had a
disproportionately male student body (e.g., engineering or military schools). Farrell,
supra note 4, at 1043. The only exception was Washington State University, which
reported commendable statistics. The study's author, however, concluded that even its
proportionality status was "illusory." See id. at 1043, 1053-55.
464 See Mott, supra note 184, at 19 (quoting Norma V. Cantu, head of OCR: "The
policy interpretation has ... enjoyed the support of every court that has addressed is-
sues of Title IX athletics.").
"" Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Prong one can be met simply by reducing men's opportunities, thereby
achieving a better statistical balance without adding any opportunities for
women. This type of institutional action hardly squares with the goals of
prongs two and three-program expansion for women and full and effective
accommodation of their interests and abilities. Nor does it square with the
regulation OCR's test purports to interpret, which also is couched in terms
of accommodating student interests and abilities. Under these circumstances,
the court in Pederson correctly questioned the suitability of proportionality
as an institutional "safe harbor."
Pederson also correctly suggested that the three-part test should be con-
sidered as a whole.4" If OCR were to remove the disjunctive "or" from its
standard, so that all three prongs had to be considered in a compliance re-
view, the test would be far more meaningful. Admittedly, application of
such a standard would be more difficult than the simple mathematics in-
volved in assessing proportionality, but the broad remedial goals of Title IX
are not particularly susceptible to bright-line rules.
Title IX's mandate is the expansion of opportunities for women, not
mathematical symmetry. Expansion, of course, requires money, and the most
obvious revenue source for underfunded schools is internal cutbacks. Institu-
tions should consider all alternatives, however, before eliminating men's
athletic teams. That type of action polarizes men and women, and as one
commentator has observed, "The gender equity reform cannot succeed if it
is only seen as some kind of crusade for women. Everyone, men and wom-
en, coaches and administrators, must work together to ensure that equitable
opportunities are made available to women in athletics." '467
Football program administrators must cooperate in the effort. Many
football programs have become accustomed to a standard of living that
cannot be justified when budgets are limited and participation opportunities
are scarce. Cost-cutting measures and a redistribution of funds could be in-
strumental in enhancing women's athletics. The fact that some football pro-
grams make money should be irrelevant. Trimming expenses is unlikely to
impact significantly revenues. Moreover, "college athletics has higher pur-
poses than merely making money. '468
466 See Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996)
(stating that "the proper analysis ... allows for consideration of all factors listed" in
OCR's policy interpretation).
467 Henderson, supra note 140, at 163.
46' Lapchick, supra note 413, at 3; see also Harris, supra note 48, at 77-78 (arguing
that the focus should be on "educational benefits" of athletic competition). One com-
mentator has reached the core of the revenue issue:
Focusing on revenue generation potential ... diverts us from the bigger picture.
This is, after all, an educational institution. Surely no one is suggesting that we
got into the athletic business just to make money. Financially, the University
would be far better off shutting down the [athletic] program entirely ....
1996]
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Few schools, of course, are likely to cut back significantly on their foot-
ball operations unless they are convinced that their programs will be able to
retain their competitive edge. "[D]isarm unilaterally and you get
whupped. 4 9 In some respects, then, progress toward gender equity is de-
pendent on the NCAA, which has the might to induce broad change on a
national scale. Many commentators have argued that it is long past time for
the NCAA to assume a more aggressive role in requiring its member institu-
tions to comply with Title IX.470
For twenty years following passage of the Act, the NCAA hindered
meaningful reform, and at one point, sued to enjoin application of Title IX
to intercollegiate athletics. 7' Only recently has the NCAA taken steps to
address inequities. In 1992, it created the NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force
to study the issue and to recommend avenues for improving the climate for
women's intercollegiate athletics.472 Following the task force's final report
in 1993, the NCAA created a Title IX guidebook for use by its member
institutions.473
In light of the NCAA's history in the gender equity area, its recent ac-
tions represent progress.474 Nonetheless, neither the task force report nor
the guidebook is satisfactory. In essence, the NCAA has made three recom-
mendations to its institutions: (1) comply with the law; (2) consider promo-
tional ideas for enhancing the visibility and support of athletics pro-
grams;475 and (3) consider adding one or more of nine "emerging"
women's sports.476 What is still missing from the NCAA is a true enforce-
We could not imagine permitting a science lab to provide the male students
with twice the amount of equipment offered to the female students in the class.
George, supra note 6, at 568-69.
469 Wolff, supra note 91, at 61.
470 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 91, at 718-19; Henderson, supra note 140, at 157;
Debra E. Blum, NCAA Urged to Find Stronger Incentives for Compliance with Gender-
Equity Plan, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 1993, at A27. But see Lamar, supra note
91, at 276 (suggesting that the NCAA "should not become involved," and that gender
equity action should be left to the state legislatures).
471 For accounts of some of the NCAA's history of hostility toward Title IX, see
Farrell, supra note 4, at 1004-06, Harris, supra note 91, at 694-95, and Martin, supra
note 41, at 487-89.
472 NCAA GENDER EQUITY GUIDE, supra note 50, at 1.
473 Id.
474 See Douglas Lederman, Abide by U.S. Sex-Bias Laws, NCAA Panel Urges Colleg-
es, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 26, 1993, at A31 (noting that women's sports advo-
cates saw promise in the "mere existence" of task force report).
... The NCAA included in its guidebook a compilation of promotional ideas submit-
ted by institutions around the country. See NCAA GENDER EQUITY GUIDE, supra note
50, at 43-50.
476 The task force identified the following as "emerging" sports: ice hockey, rowing
(crew), synchronized swimming, team handball, water polo, archery, badminton, bowl-
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ment mechanism, with sanctions for schools that do not comply with Title
IX.
47 7
Absent NCAA leadership, individual schools and athletic conferences
must set the example. Perhaps successful role models and peer pressure478
will convince other institutions that gender equity is indeed achievable. The
underlying problem is not financial, as many school administrators ar-
gue.479 Rather, it is a matter of attitude and commitment. Although some
administrators insist that schools would like to comply with Title IX but do
not know how,480 the truth is that "[i]t's fairly easy to treat men and wom-
en the same, if that's what a school really wants to do. The problem for
most institutions is not that they don't know what to do, but [that] they
don't have the will to do it."48' In the end, creation of an athletics program
of which both sexes can be proud 482 requires a few common sense rules:
ing, and squash. Id. at 51. Spokespersons for the task force indicated that "nothing sci-
entific" dictated which sports made the list, although the panel did take into account
whether they were corresponding Olympic sports for female athletes. Debra E. Blum,
'Emerging' Sports for Women, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Feb. 16, 1994, at A43. The
panel "wanted people to think creatively," but did not expect all of the emerging sports
"to take off." Id. (quoting Chris Voelz, women's athletic director at University of Min-
nesota-Twin Cities, and Phyllis L. Howlett, assistant commissioner of Big Ten Confer-
ence). One wonders how wrestlers, gymnasts, and swimmers, whose sports are Olympic
traditions, view this "creative" effort to stimulate interest in new women's sports while
their sports struggle to survive. Similarly, consider the comments of a columnist in
Madison, Wisconsin, regarding plans to add a new women's sport at the University of
Wisconsin, which earlier had eliminated men's baseball: "Lacrosse? Do you know any-
body who plays lacrosse? . . .[T]o comply with Federal rules, UW could wind up with
a lacrosse team,
but no baseball. It doesn't make any sense." Opinions, NCAA NEWS, June 21, 1995, at
4 (quoting Judie Kleinmaier, Madison, Wisconsin CAPITAL TIMES).
4" Farrell, supra note 4, at 1005-06; Pieronek, supra note 92, at 367-68. U.S. Repre-
sentative Cardiss Collins, D-Ill., who chaired a House subcommittee that held hearings
on Title IX in the early 1990s, expressed in the committee's gender equity report exas-
peration with the NCAA's failure to aggressively enforce Title IX: "It is odd that the
NCAA would place a school on probation for driving an athlete to class, or providing a
loan, but would have no penalty for a school that violates Title IX, a federal law."
Lederman, supra note 433, at A31.
478 See Henderson, supra note 140, at 158-59 (contending that peer pressure among
institutions can be "a very powerful force").
7 See supra text accompanying note 410.
See Henderson, supra note 140, at 162.
481 Title IX and Athletics, supra note 254, at 436 (quoting Arthur H. Bryant, execu-
tive director of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice).
482 The report of the NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force defined gender equity as
follows: "An athletics program can be considered gender equitable when the participants
in both the men's and women's sports programs would accept as fair and equitable the
overall program of the other gender." NCAA GENDER EQuITY GUIDE, supra note 50, at
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listen to female student athletes; respond appropriately to their requests for
specific program enhancements; learn, through surveys or otherwise, about
their athletic interests and abilities; promote and publicize women's athlet-
ics; be creative in seeking and developing new athletic opportunities;4. 3
and above all else, treat women and their athletic abilities with respect.
1.
483 One of the most interesting new ideas is the development of women's intercolle-
giate wrestling programs. See Peter Monaghan, Women on the Mat, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Apr. 5, 1996, at A37 (profiling women's wrestling program at California State
University at Bakersfield).
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